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EXCLUSIONARY AMENITIES IN RESIDENTIAL
COMMUNITIES
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz*
This Article identifies an important mechanism by which segrega-
tion arises in new residential developments. The Fair Housing Act
and other antidiscrimination laws closely regulate real estate sales,
advertising, and racial steering. As a result of these laws and other
factors, home purchasers often lack accurate information about the
likely demographic makeup of a new neighborhood or condomin-
ium building. Yet these laws have not eroded the incentives for hous-
ing consumers to obtain this data. This Article argues that develop-
ers circumvent fair housing laws by embedding costly,
demographically polarizing amenities within a new development
and recording covenants mandating that all homeowners pay for
those amenities. Its central claim is that developers will select com-
mon amenities not only on the basis of which amenities are inher-
ently welfare-maximizing for the residents, but also on the basis of
which amenities most effectively deter undesired residents from pur-
chasing homes therein. The Article dubs this approach the exclu-
sionary amenities strategy and shows how it causes sorting and focal
point mechanisms to act in concert, thereby engendering substantial
residential homogeneity. The inability to exclude functions as an in-
ducement to spend.
During the 1990s, the United States experienced a boom in the
construction of residential developments built around costly golf
courses. This occurred at a time when golf participation functioned
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as a noticeably better proxy for race than income, wealth, or virtu-
ally any other characteristic. Curiously, a substantial number of
Americans who purchased homes in mandatory-membership golf
communities played no golf This Article offers circumstantial evi-
dence suggesting that by purchasing homes in these communities,
homeowners may have been paying a premium for residential racial
homogeneity. The Article then identifies a number of other examples
where developers, or even municipalities, appear to be pursuing an
exclusionary amenities strategy. It also identifies instances in which
the use of exclusionary amenities may promote neutral, or even
laudable, objectives.
The Article then notes the possibility of inclusionary amenities,
and shows how a few developers, common interest communities,
and municipalities have used these amenities to achieve greater resi-
dential heterogeneity than would otherwise have been possible. It
concludes by evaluating the law's current stance of leaving exclu-
sionary amenities largely unregulated and examines various strate-
gies to curb the use of problematic exclusionary amenities.
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INTRODUCTION
DURING recent decades, courts and legislatures have devoted
L a great deal of time and energy to stamping out various forms
of housing discrimination. These efforts have included a refusal to
enforce racially discriminatory covenants,' the development of
various legal doctrines to police overt racial discrimination in the
residential housing context,2 and numerous statutory initiatives de-
signed to prevent discrimination in housing sales, leases, and adver-
tising.3 As a result, a real estate developer's choice of language,
human models, and media are all subject to legal scrutiny.
Despite these governmental efforts, many housing consumers
still have preferences for certain forms of exclusion.4 Some people
will want to exclude young homeowners from a common interest
community or apartment complex, and others will want to exclude
the elderly.' Others may want to exclude members of particular re-
ligious minorities or majorities.' Still other homeowners may want
to exclude "new money," families with children, Republicans, Afri-
can Americans, or even residents who lack fashion sense from par-
'See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
2See, e.g., Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 437 (1973);
Rosemarie Maldonado & Robert D. Rose, The Application of Civil Rights Laws to
Housing Cooperatives: Are Co-ops Bastions of Discriminatory Exclusion or Self-
Selecting Models of Community-Based Living?, 23 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1245 (1996).
3See, e.g., Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 804, 82 Stat. 73, 83 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2000)); New Jersey Fair Housing Act, N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 52:27D-301-29 (West 2001).
4 See, e.g., Evan McKenzie, Privatopia: Homeowner Associations and the Rise of
Residential Private Government 60-78 (1994); David M. Cutler et al., The Rise and
Decline of the American Ghetto, 107 J. Pol. Econ. 455, 477 (1999); Reynolds Farley &
William H. Frey, Changes in the Segregation of Whites from Blacks During the 1980s:
Small Steps Toward a More Integrated Society, 59 Am. Soc. Rev. 23, 28 (1994).
'See, e.g., Seniors Civil Liberties Ass'n v. Kemp, 965 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir. 1992);
McKenzie, supra note 4, at 57.6 See, e.g., Taormina Theosophical Cmty. v. Silver, 140 Cal. App. 3d 964 (Ct. App.
1983). For a fascinating discussion of the residential exclusion impulse in the religious
setting, see Adam M. Samaha, Endorsement Retires: Religious Symbols and Anti-
Sorting Principles, 2005 Sup. Ct. Rev. (forthcoming).
440 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 92:437
ticular residential communities.7 And some people appear willing
to pay a substantial premium for this privilege.8 Whatever the law
says about the legality of certain kinds of exclusion, individual
preferences for exclusion will persist to varying degrees.9
People interested in residential homogeneity inevitably will try
to thwart integration using creative substitutes for overt discrimi-
nation. This Article explores one such response, which goes essen-
tially unregulated by antidiscrimination laws. It then examines the
pros and cons of inclusionary government remedies. Perhaps coun-
terintuitively, the primary exclusionary devices I have in mind are
various types of club goods, although local public goods can serve
the same purpose too.
Club goods are somewhat rivalrous resources from which out-
siders can be excluded," for which "the optimal sharing group is
more than one person or family but smaller than an infinitely large
7See, e.g., Camille Zubrinsky Charles, Processes of Racial Residential Segregation,
in Urban Inequality: Evidence from Four Cities 217, 259 tbl.4.6 (Alice O'Connor et
al. eds., 2001) (noting that 11% of whites responded in a survey that they wanted to
live in neighborhoods that were 100% white, and that 2.5% of black respondents said
they wanted to live in all-black neighborhoods); see also Michael 0. Emerson et al.,
Does Race Matter in Residential Segregation? Exploring the Preferences of White
Americans, 66 Am. Soc. Rev. 922, 927-32 (2001) (finding that the presence of Asian
Americans and Latinos had little effect on whites' willingness to move into a
neighborhood once crime, public school quality, and anticipated appreciation of real
estate were controlled, but that the presence of African Americans had a very sub-
stantial effect on whites' willingness to move into the neighborhood, even after con-
trolling for these variables); Abby Goodnough, Salsa Dancers? Stunt Men? It's a Mi-
ami Condo Party, N.Y. Times, May 23, 2005, at A16 (discussing the over-the-top
efforts of condominium developers to attract "image-conscious people, many from
Latin America and Europe" with lavish sales parties designed to "emulate the club
scene," including one party at a "sports-inspired" condominium with "trampoline art-
ists, masseuses, an aura reader, an oxygen bar, and sales agents in tracksuits").
8 Cutler et al., supra note 4, at 476; Patrick Bayer et al., An Equilibrium Model of
Sorting in an Urban Housing Market (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 10865, 2004); Patrick Bayer et al., Residential Segregation in General Equilib-
rium (Yale Univ. Econ. Growth Ctr., Center Discussion Paper No. 885, 2004);
Stephen L. Ross, Segregation and Racial Preferences: An Analysis of Choice Based
on Satisfaction and Outcome Measures 1-4 (Univ. of Conn. Dep't of Econ., Working
Paper No. 2002-04, 2002).
'See Joe R. Feagin, Excluding Blacks and Others from Housing: The Foundation of
White Racism, 4 Cityscape: J. of Pol'y Dev. & Res. 79, 81-88 (1999).
"Todd Sandler & John Tschirhart, Club Theory: Thirty Years Later, 93 Pub.
Choice 335, 335-38 (1997). The leading academic treatment of club goods is Richard
Cornes & Todd Sandier, The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods
347-480 (2d ed. 1996).
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number."" Residential elevators, concierges, and tennis courts are
classic examples of club goods, in that few individuals or nuclear
families find it worth their while to include such resources in their
living quarters, but these resources can become quite attractive
when their costs and benefits can be divided among multiple
households.' 2 If too few people are using the elevator, concierge, or
tennis court, then it will go to waste, and those who must pay for a
share of the resource will be overtaxed by their condominium or
homeowners' associations. If, on the other hand, too many people
try to use the resource in question, it will become too crowded and
provide insufficient value to members of the club. Access to club
goods is, in large measure, what makes residence in a common in-
terest community attractive to so many families.
The exclusionary amenities strategy begins with a simple first
step: A developer of a common interest community can embed
particularly costly club goods within the residential development
and then record covenants and declarations that require all present
and future members of the community to contribute toward their
maintenance on the basis of some criteria other than use. The will-
ingness to pay for these goods will function as a sorting mechanism
for would-be residents. People who are likely to use the club good
will purchase homes in the common interest community, and those
who are unlikely to use it will be deterred from joining the com-
munity. So far, there is nothing insidious about this process. Those
who like to swim will gravitate toward condo developments with
nice pools, and those who like to play softball may join homeown-
ers' associations that invest in attractive softball diamonds. This
seems perfectly natural, and welfare enhancing, as Charles Tiebout
argued long ago." Such self-sorting increases homogeneity within
James M. Buchanan, An Economic Theory of Clubs, 32 Economica 1, 2 (1965).2Robert D. Tollison, Consumption Sharing and Non-Exclusion Rules, 39
Economica 276,287 (1972).
"3 Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. Pol. Econ. 416
(1956). Tiebout argued that residents' decisions to move to, or stay in, particular
communities revealed their preferences for various packages of public goods and
taxes. Where residential mobility is relatively unconstrained, and there are many
communities from which to choose, each individual could be expected to flock to
"that community which best satisfies his preference pattern for public goods." Id. at
418. If there are many such communities within a geographic area, then the immigra-
tion and emigration of residents will mimic the buying and selling that disciplines the
market. As a result, Tiebout argued that an efficient market could emerge in the pro-
2006] 441
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residential communities, but heterogeneous preferences with re-
spect to sporting activities do not seem like something the law
should combat-at least not at first glance.
The worrisome part of this story arises in the following circum-
stance. What if a developer selects a particular club good, not be-
cause the members of an association will actually derive substantial
value from its use, but because the club good in question deters
members of undesired groups from joining the community in ques-
tion?" In this case, potential members may join the club, and hap-
pily pay for the club good, knowing that by purchasing this club
good they are simultaneously receiving the "benefits" of exclusion
without violating antidiscrimination laws. Whereas Tiebout envi-
sioned municipalities competing for residents by providing them
vision of municipal services. Id. at 423-24; see also Robert W. Helsley & William C.
Strange, Exclusion and the Theory of Clubs, 24 Can. J. Econ. 888, 897 (1991) (arguing
that the provision of club goods will also be Pareto efficient if excluding outsiders is
costly).
For further development of Tiebout's ideas within the legal literature, see Vicki
Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitu-
tional Conditions Doctrine, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 473 (1991); William W. Bratton & Jo-
seph A. McCahery, The New Economics of Jurisdictional Competition: Devolution-
ary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 Geo. L.J. 201 (1997); Lee Anne Fennell,
Beyond Exit and Voice: User Participation in the Production of Local Public Goods,
80 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (2001); Nicole Stelle Garnett, Ordering (and Order in) the City, 57
Stan. L. Rev. 1, 43-47 (2004); Clayton P. Gillette, Opting Out of Public Provision, 73
Denv. U. L. Rev. 1185 (1996); and Todd E. Pettys, The Mobility Paradox, 92 Geo.
L.J. 481 (2004). For criticisms of Tiebout's theory, see Truman F. Bewley, A Critique
of Tiebout's Theory of Local Public Expenditures, 49 Econometrica 713 (1981).
"Tiebout, in a footnote, speculated that individuals might desire to live near "nice"
neighbors, but he did not pursue the implications of this idea for his theory. Tiebout,
supra note 13, at 418 n.12; see also Sandler & Tschirhart, supra note 10, at 344 ("Once
heterogeneity is allowed in clubs, sharing arrangement can account for members con-
suming both the shared good and the characteristics or attributes of other mem-
bers."). In the 1970s, Allan De Serpa modeled the idea that individuals may derive
utility or disutility based on the extent to which their fellow club members have par-
ticular characteristics. Allan C. De Serpa, A Theory of Discriminatory Clubs, 24 Scot.
J. Pol. Econ. 33, 34 (1977). De Serpa did not develop a model of exclusionary club
goods or anything like it. Rather, his major contribution consisted of noting the possi-
bility that these preferences for particular kinds of club memberships would affect the
Pareto optimum level of club goods provision. Id. at 39. Lee Fennell has also argued
that individuals will care substantially about the nature of the people with whom they
share local public goods, and that neighbors who enhance the quality of such goods
(e.g., smart students or neighborhood watch members) will have incentives to coa-
lesce into communities that exclude less cooperative members. Fennell, supra note 13,
at 26-29.
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with the goods, services, and tax packages that they valued most,
we can now imagine a world in which homeowners' associations
(and perhaps municipalities) compete for the residents that they
want by providing them with the goods, services, and assessment
packages that are least palatable to undesired potential residents."
Such associations thereby select common amenities, not only on
the basis of what amenities are inherently welfare enhancing, but
also on the basis of how effectively those amenities promote self-
selection by would-be residents. The most valuable club goods for
these purposes are the ones that send the clearest messages to de-
sirable and undesirable prospective purchasers.
There are two mechanisms that enable exclusionary amenities to
promote residential segregation. The first relates to sorting'6 and
the second relates to focal points.'7 The sorting mechanism can be
explained succinctly. To the extent that a taste for a common
amenity, x, functions as a proxy for some characteristic, y, then
sorting on the basis of willingness to pay for x will produce, as a
predictable side effect, sorting on the basis of y as well. Mandating
"Becker and Murphy have noted in passing a similar version of this argument in
the context of municipalities' efforts to promote segregation. See Gary S. Becker &
Kevin M. Murphy, Social Economics: Market Behavior in a Social Environment 72
(2000). Becker and Murphy observed that local governments may use "highly restric-
tive zoning requirements, housing codes that add greatly to the cost of building
houses, and generous spending on schools, swimming pools, and other public activi-
ties that raise property taxes" because these forms of regulation would appeal more to
"the rich, whites, Catholics, or other groups [municipalities] want to attract." Id. Their
discussion further noted that these strategies could function as wasteful, hard-to-
detect substitutes for outright discrimination by local governments. Id. Note that al-
though they mention race and religion, Becker and Murphy's discussion of the issue is
principally oriented toward economic segregation. I am aware of no evidence sup-
porting the proposition that, once one controls for wealth and income, different racial
or religious groups exhibit sharply divergent preferences for school quality, large lot
sizes, or swimming pools. Thus Becker and Murphy's approach to the topic and their
selection of examples suggest that amenity-related strategies are analytically identical
to exclusionary zoning, whose segregation-promoting properties have been well un-
derstood since at least the 1960s. Perhaps for that reason they elected not to develop
their insight in any detail.
6 For prior discussions of sorting in the residential context, see Tiebout, supra note
13, at 422; see also Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1399,
1454-57 (2005).
" For more on focal points, see generally Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Con-
flict 57-71 (1980); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86
Va. L. Rev. 1649 (2000); Robert Sugden, A Theory of Focal Points, 105 Econ. J. 533
(1995).
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that all residents of a neighborhood pay for amenity x will function
as a tax that falls disproportionately on populations that do not
possess characteristic y.
The focal point mechanism is more complex. The idea here is
that consumers will understand the sorting properties of exclusion-
ary amenities and that those who want to live in a community with
lots of people who possess characteristic y will purchase homes in
communities that provide amenity x. By the same token, consum-
ers who do not want to live among those who overwhelmingly pos-
sess characteristic y will be deterred from purchasing a home in a
subdivision that offers amenity x. Amenity x therefore functions as
a focal point around which consumers who care about the presence
or absence of characteristic y can organize themselves. The poten-
tial danger, of course, is that characteristic y may be a racial, reli-
gious, or other suspect classification. If the public understands the
correlation between amenity x and characteristic y, then, by adver-
tising the presence of amenity x, real estate developers may un-
dermine the efficacy of laws that prohibit discriminatory advertis-
ing in the real estate market.
American antidiscrimination laws have gone to great lengths in
recent years to make prospective purchasers of homes in a newly
planned development ignorant of its likely racial composition."8 If
" See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2000); Martin D. Abravanel, Public Knowledge of
Fair Housing Law: Does It Protect Against Housing Discrimination?, 13 Housing
Pol'y Debate 469, 480-83 (2002) (noting widespread public knowledge of the Fair
Housing Act's provisions prohibiting racially discriminatory advertising and steering);
Teresa Coleman Hunter & Gary L. Fischer, Fair Housing Testing-Uncovering Dis-
criminatory Practices, 28 Creighton L. Rev. 1127, 1132 (1995) (describing federal ef-
forts to enforce fair housing laws using government officials posing as would-be pur-
chasers or renters); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 943, 1013 (1995) ("Under the Fair Housing Act, it is illegal for a real estate bro-
ker to indicate, whether asked or not, what the racial makeup of a community is when
a buyer is purchasing residential property. Nor can a broker indicate the racial pat-
terns of purchasing and selling in a neighborhood."); Dmitri Mehlhorn, A Requiem
for Blockbusting: Law, Economics, and Race-Based Real Estate Speculation, 67
Fordham L. Rev. 1145, 1180-81 (1998) (noting how anti-blockbusting statutes also
constrain real estate agents' ability to discuss anticipated changes in neighborhood
racial composition). It is unclear whether the Fair Housing Act bars real estate agents
from providing neighborhood racial composition data to a prospective purchaser at
the purchaser's request. Compare Vill. of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1530
(7th Cir. 1990) (no liability), with Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028, 1051 n.ll (E.D.
Mich. 1975) (noting the possibility of liability) and National Fair Housing Advocate
Online, The Buyer's Agent Issue, http://www.fairhousing.com/index.cfm?method=
444 [Vol. 92:437
2006] Exclusionary Amenities 445
few residents have moved into a new neighborhood, it may be
quite difficult for prospective purchasers to obtain accurate infor-
mation about their fellow prospective purchasers through simple
observation. 9 In addition, to the extent that many initial buyers will
be real estate speculators, as opposed to owner occupiers, the de-
veloper himself may lack information about the planned develop-
ment's initial racial composition.0 Yet such information matters
greatly to many purchasers, who fear buying into a new develop-
ment with a racial composition that is not to their liking, particu-
larly given the tendency for neighborhood composition to change
rapidly in the manner predicted by Tom Schelling's "tipping" mod-
els.2
page.display&pagename=HUD-resources.buyers-agent (reprinting a 1996 letter in
which the Department of Housing and Urban Development's Assistant Secretary for
Fair Housing and Equal Employment states: "[F]rom the standpoint of legally pru-
dent, as well as ethical, considerations, I would strongly advise against any agent or
broker ... accommodating a request that a housing search be limited based on race,
or other protected-class terms."). Despite the law's efforts to regulate real estate
agents' conduct, steering and other forms of housing discrimination persist. See Doug-
las S. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making
of the Underclass 104-05 (1993); Jan Ondrich et al., Do Real Estate Brokers Choose
to Discriminate? Evidence from the 1989 Housing Discrimination Study, 64 S. Econ.
J. 880, 889-90 (1998).
" Communities concerned about residential tipping have even been willing to enact
laws barring homeowners from placing "For Sale" signs on their property, out of fear
that the prevalence of such signs would signal white flight to prospective home pur-
chasers. See Linmark Assoc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 87-88 (1977). These
restrictions have been invalidated on First Amendment grounds. Id. at 95-98.
20 See Patrice Hill, Region Joins Housing Bubble: Overvalued Homes a Worry,
Wash. Times, Feb. 14, 2005, at Al (remarking on the abundance of speculators in
Washington, D.C.); Ted Pincus, Area Realty Market Keeps on Rolling Along, Chi.
Sun-Times, Oct. 12, 2004, at 61 (noting the same in Chicago); Linda Rawls, Condo
Market Headed for 'Day of Reckoning,' Experts Warn, Palm Beach Post, Aug. 6,
2004, at 2D (observing that up to 70% of South Florida condominium buyers are
speculators who do not intend to occupy the units).
21 Tom Schelling's work on neighborhood "tipping" suggests the bleak possibility
that complete residential segregation is inevitable if both Caucasians and African
Americans prefer to live in diverse neighborhoods where they are part of the majority
group. See Thomas Schelling, Dynamic Models of Segregation, 1 J. Mathematical Soc.
143, 180-86 (1971); see also Ondrich et al., supra note 18, at 891. Schelling's approach
has been the subject of some recent criticism on both theoretical and empirical
grounds. See, e.g., Becker & Murphy, supra note 15, at 69-70; Abraham Bell &
Gideon Parchomovsky, The Integration Game, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1965 (2000); Wil-
liam Easterly, The Racial Tipping Point in American Neighborhoods: Unstable Equi-
librium or Urban Legend? (June 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Vir-
ginia Law Review). But cf. William A. V. Clark, Residential Preferences and
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Caucasians who purchase homes in a new development that ul-
timately tips toward African American composition will incur sub-
stantial economic costs as a result.' Real estate has historically ap-
preciated much more quickly in all-white neighborhoods than in
neighborhoods that have a ten percent African American popula-
tion, and noticeably more quickly in ten percent African American
neighborhoods than in twenty percent African American
neighborhoods.' Thus, relatively minor changes in the racial com-
position of a neighborhood can have enormous consequences for a
home owning family's net worth, and may cause families to change
residences more frequently than they would prefer. Accordingly,
prospective buyers will purchase under tremendous uncertainty,
softening the demand for residences in new developments where
the likely racial composition is as yet unknown.24
In this situation, we can expect substantial pent up demand for
information about a new development's likely racial composition.
Exclusionary club goods function as a mechanism for reducing the
Neighborhood Racial Segregation: A Test of the Schelling Segregation Model, 28
Demography 1, 17 (1991) (concluding that Schelling's account is more right than
wrong). One problem with the strong version of Schelling's hypothesis is that precise
neighborhood-level or block-level racial composition data is hard to obtain, largely
because of governmental efforts to combat residential segregation. Schelling seems to
assume that residents have, or at some point obtain, perfect information about the
racial composition of their neighborhoods. The strong version of his model also
deemphasizes factors such as loss aversion, stubbornness, preferences among some
citizens for substantial diversity, and the transaction costs associated with real estate
transactions. All these considerations help explain why many neighborhoods in the
United States achieve a stable equilibrium at some point other than complete racial
homogeneity.
"Property values appreciate much less quickly in largely African American
neighborhoods than in largely Caucasian neighborhoods. See, e.g., Francine D. Blau
& John W. Graham, Black-White Differences in Wealth and Asset Composition, 105
Q.J. Econ. 321, 333 (1990); David Rusk, The Brookings Institution Center on Urban
& Metropolitan Policy, The "Segregation Tax": The Cost of Racial Segregation to
Black Homeowners 4-5 (Brookings Inst. Survey Series, 2001).
'3 Sunwoong Kim, Race and Home Price Appreciation in Urban Neighborhoods:
Evidence from Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 28 Rev. of Black Pol. Econ. 9, 25-26 & Exh. 7
(2000).
14 Housing in developments that were planned after the enactment of the 1968 Fair
Housing Act is less racially segregated than housing in older neighborhoods, where
lawful, overt discrimination helped entrench a racially segregated housing equilib-
rium. See Joe T. Darden & Sameh M. Kamel, Black Residential Segregation in Sub-
urban Detroit: Empirical Testing of the Ecological Theory, 27 Rev. of Black Pol.
Econ. 103, 106 (2000); Farley & Frey, supra note 4, at 28, 36-37.
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uncertainty and transition costs associated with residential tipping.
Exclusionary club goods address this uncertainty by communicat-
ing to African American and Caucasian purchasers which direction
the development is likely to tip. By promoting the sorting of suc-
cessive purchasers, exclusionary club goods may also provide a
permanent bulwark against "reverse tipping" that might result
from blockbusting activities organized by real estate agents or
community groups.' This analysis suggests that exclusionary club
goods may be quite valuable in new residential developments pre-
cisely because they make the tipping process far more efficient.
Exclusionary club goods serve a different function in established
developments. There they function as social goods that cause many
neighborhood residents to congregate in particular places, which
dramatically lowers the information costs associated with subse-
quent prospective purchasers' efforts to discern a neighborhood's
racial composition.
The exclusionary amenities scenario can be made concrete with
the following hypothetical. Say a developer wants to create a resi-
dential community within a heterogeneous metropolitan area,
where whites and blacks have similar income levels, and each racial
group comprises fifty percent of the population. Suppose the de-
veloper knows that the only salient difference between blacks and
whites is that eighty percent of whites play polo, whereas only
twenty percent of blacks play polo. Finally, suppose, consistent
with empirical data, that there is substantial market demand for
housing developments that are relatively racially homogenous.26
The sophisticated developer might build his residential develop-
Blockbusting occurs when real estate agents intentionally promote rapid racial
tipping in a neighborhood as a means of obtaining sizable commissions on home sales.
For more on blockbusting, see Arnold R. Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto: Race
and Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960, at 31-36 (1998); McKenzie, supra note 4, at 72;
Drew S. Days, III, Rethinking the Integrative Ideal: Housing, 33 McGeorge L. Rev.
459, 465 (2002); and Mehlhorn, supra note 18, at 1145.
26For a comprehensive review of the literature on preferences for residential segre-
gation, see Casey J. Dawkins, Recent Evidence on the Continuing Causes of Black-
White Residential Segregation, 26 J. Urb. Aff. 379 (2004). A less comprehensive lit-
erature review, albeit one with a greater emphasis on work by legal scholars, appears
in A. Mechele Dickerson, Caught in the Trap: Pricing Racial Housing Preferences,
103 Mich. L. Rev. 1273 (2005) (reviewing Elizabeth Warren & Amelia Warren Tyagi,
The Two-Income Trap: Why Middle-Class Mothers & Fathers Are Going Broke
(With Surprising Solutions That Will Change Our Children's Futures) (2004)).
2006] 447
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ment around a polo grounds, and require that all those who pur-
chase homes in the vicinity pay annual assessments to support the
upkeep, staffing, and real estate taxes associated with the polo
grounds and their affiliated stables.
At base, we might expect that the resulting population of home-
owners will be eighty percent white and twenty percent black, be-
cause non-polo players will decide to spend their real estate dollars
elsewhere. Embedding a polo grounds within a residential commu-
nity will function in a manner similar to charging a racially dispro-
portionate tax on purchases within the subdivision, whereby blacks
are charged more for homes than whites. This sorting mechanism
will be supplemented by a focal points effect. To the extent that
some Caucasian home purchasers have a preference for living in a
predominantly white community, we will expect that the popula-
tion of our development may become even more skewed. After all,
the community in question will attract not only those who have a
strong interest in polo, but those who have a strong interest in
white residential homogeneity. This latter group is not paying a
premium for the polo grounds and stables per se. Rather, it is pay-
ing a premium for the perceived benefits of racial exclusion.27 Ide-
ally, this group might prefer to live in a community that practiced
overt racial discrimination,' but because the law thwarts such dis-
crimination, this polo grounds development represents the next
"best" alternative. While antidiscrimination laws prevent the de-
"There may be some African Americans who will pay a large premium to live in
overwhelmingly Caucasian neighborhoods, but evidently these African Americans do
not exist in large numbers. See Charles, supra note 7, at 259 tbl.4.6; Dawkins, supra
note 26, at 387-93. Moreover, African Americans are unlikely to move into neighbor-
hoods that are believed to contain a large percentage of residents who do not want
African American neighbors. See Charles, supra note 7, at 230-31. Note further that
virtually all white respondents to a telephone survey stated that they were unwilling
to move into a neighborhood in which African Americans comprised sixty-five per-
cent or more of the residents, even though pollsters informed the white respondents
that crime in the neighborhood was low, school quality was high, and housing values
were increasing. Emerson et al., supra note 7, at 930.
28 Or it might not. Overt discrimination may be socially costly in a way that discrimi-
nation-by-amenities is not. Perhaps this results from the ambiguous social meaning of
exclusionary club goods strategies or the law's decision to sanction one form of dis-
crimination but not the other. Cf. Clayton P. Gillette, Courts, Covenants, and Com-
munities, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1375, 1432 (1994) (noting the expressive harms engen-
dered by visible homeowners' association actions that would conflict with
antidiscrimination laws if undertaken with state involvement).
448 [Vol. 92:437
Exclusionary Amenities
veloper from advertising in a way that provide prospective pur-
chasers with information about the likely racial composition of the
new neighborhood, the presence of a polo grounds will communi-
cate such a message to attentive prospective residents.
In the real world, gated communities built around polo grounds
are rare, though Forbes has identified a few of them.29 But those
built around golf courses are common, and during the 1990s golf
had precisely the polarizing attributes that my hypothetical as-
cribed to polo. This Article will explore the possibility that residen-
tial golf communities have functioned as exclusionary club goods.
At the same time, it will point to instances in which the exclusion-
ary amenities strategy might contribute to acceptable, or perhaps
even laudable, types of residential sorting.
The Article will proceed as follows. Part I will briefly examine
the possibility of exclusion premiums. Residential settings that
provide members with opportunities to discriminate among those
who can afford to join the community command a premium, par-
ticularly at the high end of the real estate market. Part II will de-
velop the idea of the exclusionary club good and the exclusionary
public good (collectively, "exclusionary amenities") and will point
out the possibilities for using these amenities to exclude groups
from developments where antidiscrimination law proscribes more
"efficient" forms of exclusion. It will also examine some tentative
empirical evidence on exclusionary amenities, focusing on residen-
tial golf course developments. Part III will introduce the idea of
"inclusionary amenities" and will examine the possibility that a de-
veloper's decision to forego such resources in a common interest
community might provide additional opportunities to exclude un-
desired prospective residents, albeit by depriving the community's
members of resources whose provision they would otherwise find
welfare-enhancing. Part IV will examine possible legal responses to
29 See Sara Clemence, Most Expensive Gated Communities in America 2004,
Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/2004/11/19/cx-sc-1119home.html ("One on our list of
the most expensive in the country has security patrols on the water to keep watch on
multi-million-dollar yachts. Others have polo grounds and picnics with all the right
people."). This paper does not discuss polo further, but readers interested in an ex-
ploration of polo's exclusivity and cultural significance to white economic elites
should consult Corey Dolgon, The End of the Hamptons: Scenes from the Class
Struggle in American's Paradise 134-46 (2005).
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the introduction of exclusionary amenities or the absence of inclu-
sionary amenities in residential communities.
I. THE EXCLUSION PREMIUM
A recent paper by Michael Schill, loan Voicu, and Jonathan
Miller identifies an interesting puzzle in the Manhattan real estate
market.' As a general matter, apartments in condominiums attract
a premium over similar apartments in housing cooperatives. Con-
trolling for the many variables that differentiate housing units,
Schill and his co-authors found that, as a general matter, a condo-
minium apartment commands a 15.5% premium over a similarly
situated cooperative.3' This finding was consistent with the expecta-
tions of Manhattan real estate agents.32
Why this discrepancy between condominiums and cooperatives?
On this point, Schill and his co-authors identified several respects
in which the condominium structure is more efficient and more de-
sirable than the cooperative structure. They summarized the most
important benefits of the condominium structure as follows:
"Unlike the case of cooperative apartments, condominium owners
do not effectively share liability on mortgage debt, they are free to
transfer their apartments to whomever they choose, they are sub-
ject to fewer rules than cooperative apartment owners and, corre-
spondingly, they need spend less time in internal governance."33
On this account, Manhattan sounds like a real estate market that
works perfectly. The efficient ownership regime confers value on
owners, and the inefficient regime confers losses on owners who
adhere to it.' New buildings in Manhattan overwhelmingly struc-
ture themselves as condominiums, not cooperatives,35 but the high
costs of transitioning from the cooperative to the condominium
3 Michael H. Schill et al., The Condominium v. Cooperative Puzzle: An Empirical
Analysis of Housing in New York City (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper Se-
ries, Working Paper No. 04-003, 2004).31 Id. at 30.
32 Id. at 5, 11.
13 Id. at 1.
'3 See Henry Hansmann, Condominium and Cooperative Housing: Transactional
Efficiency, Tax Subsidies, and Tenure Choice, 20 J. Legal Stud. 25, 30 (1991).
" Schill et al., supra note 30, at 5.
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form explain why there are still many cooperative buildings in New
York.6
Strikingly, however, Schill and his co-authors identified a group
of apartments in which the ordinary patterns were reversed. For
these apartments, the cooperative form actually conferred a very
substantial premium-nearly twenty-one percent-on owners."
The distinguishing characteristic of cooperative units that com-
mand a premium is that they bar financing as part of the purchase
of a unit. These units, in short, are in buildings where the owners
can afford to buy homes without any need for a mortgage. Prohibi-
tions on mortgage financing arise in both condominium and coop-
erative buildings, but it is the cooperative apartment buildings that
command a hefty premium as the domain of Manhattan's eco-
nomic elites.
Let us be quite clear about what this data means. Wealthy own-
ers of Manhattan cooperative apartments seem willing to pay a
hefty premium, sacrifice substantial leisure time, and forego a great
deal of financial privacy at the time of purchase, all for the benefits
of exclusivity and having a much greater say in who their neighbors
are.38 For money-is-no-object types, the leisure-time premium paid
by cooperative owners may be even more substantial than the eco-
nomic premium. Cooperatives' authority to exclude has been exer-
cised to keep the likes of Madonna and Richard Nixon out of pres-
36 Id. at 32-33. Schill et al. identify substantial transaction costs and adverse tax
consequences associated with transitioning a cooperative building into a
condominium. During the last three decades, the percentage of common interest
communities that have used the cooperative form has plummeted. Evan McKenzie,
Common-Interest Housing in the Communities of Tomorrow, 14 Housing Pol'y
Debate 203, 207 tbl.2 (2003).37 Schill et al., supra note 30, at 30.
38 Id. at 10; see also id. at 31 ("The reasons for this rather large relative shift from a
sizable condominium premium to a discount are not absolutely clear. One explana-
tion may be that for a relatively small segment of cooperative apartment owners, the
cooperative form is value-maximizing because of the power it gives to owners to
maintain exclusivity. A large proportion (79.3 percent) of the apartment sales in
buildings with rules prohibiting financing were also in the top decline of cooperative
apartment values. This suggests that affluent New Yorkers may be using the 'no fi-
nancing' restriction to maintain an affluent living environment and that the benefits of
social exclusiveness, themselves, generate value for these purchasers."). Condomin-
ium owners have far less discretion to prevent sales to particular buyers than do co-
operative owners.
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tigious New York buildings,39 but there is also some evidence sug-
gesting that it has been used to exclude members of historically
marginalized groups. ' In recent years, the New York courts have
begun policing decisions to exclude members of protected groups
from cooperative apartments closely. 1
This data suggests something else that is equally important. Be-
fore the advent of antidiscrimination laws and doctrines, restric-
tions on alienation and club membership could keep undesired
prospective residents out of certain communities. But once the
state began enforcing antidiscrimination laws, people who wished
to exclude these undesirables had to do so on the basis of proxies. 2
Wealth and income often provide important proxies, and suburbs
in particular manage to maintain substantial exclusivity by restrict-
ing neighborhoods to single-family homes built on large lots. 3 The
Manhattan cooperatives, however, show that price will sometimes
be an inadequate exclusionary proxy. People may want to exclude
"new money" or "old money" or members of a particular political
party from their communities, and they will seek out some mecha-
nism for doing so. This helps explain the cooperative premium at
the high end. In recent decades, income and wealth have become
poorer proxies for race and other characteristics that have often
formed the basis for exclusion." Once wealth and income become
less useful proxies, people interested in screening their neighbors
may have to turn to other characteristics.
Id. at 10 n.8.
, See Maldonado & Rose, supra note 2, at 1245-46; Sabrina Malpeli, Comment,
Cracking Down on Cooperative Board Decisions that Reject Applicants Based on
Race: Broome v. Biondi, 73 St. John's L. Rev. 313 (1999).
" Maldonado & Rose, supra note 2, at 1245-46.42 See generally William J. Collins, The Housing Market Impact of State-Level
Antidiscrimination Laws 1960-1970 (Vanderbilt Univ. Dep't of Econ., Working Pa-
per No. 03-W04, 2003) (examining the effects of antidiscrimination law enforcement
on the housing market).
,3 Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal
Analysis, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1841, 1894-1906 (1994); J. Peter Byrne, Are Suburbs Un-
constitutional?, 85 Geo. L.J. 2265, 2265-72 (1997) (book review).
" See infra note 87.
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II. "IF You BUILD IT, THEY WON'T COME":
AN INTRODUCTION TO EXCLUSIONARY AMENITIES
On the basis of the Schill et al. research and similar studies,'5 it
seems appropriate to assume a market demand for exclusion in the
residential setting, particularly at the highest income levels. Some
other studies suggest that, as incomes rise, the demand for racially
homogeneous neighborhoods actually increases." Residential ex-
clusion, in that sense, may be something of a luxury good. This
conclusion coincides with a standard assumption in the club goods
literature that club members derive utility from having fellow
members with desired characteristics and disutility from having
members with undesired characteristics.4 '7 As soon as that assump-
41 See supra note 26 and sources cited therein.
'6 See, e.g., Patrick Bayer et al., An Equilibrium Model of Sorting in an Urban
Housing Market: The Causes and Consequences of Residential Segregation 65-66
(Yale Univ. Econ. Growth Ctr., Center Discussion Paper No. 860, 2003). This trend is
evidently more pronounced for Caucasians than for African Americans. See Richard
D. Alba et al., How Segregated Are Middle-Class African Americans?, 47 Soc. Probs.
543, 556 (2000); Dawkins, supra note 26, at 382-83.
" See, e.g., De Serpa, supra note 14, at 34; Sandler & Tschirhart, supra note 10, at
344 ("Once heterogeneity is allowed in clubs, sharing arrangement can account for
members consuming both the shared good and the characteristics or attributes of
other members. Members' characteristics may be viewed by the other members as
generating either an increase (e.g., intelligence in a learned society) or a decrease
(e.g., rudeness) in utility.") (citation omitted); Suzanne Scotchmer, On Price-Taking
Equilibria in Club Economies with Nonanonymous Crowding, 65 J. Pub. Econ. 75,
75-76 (1997); see also Fernando Jaramillo & Fabien Moizeau, Conspicuous Con-
sumption and Social Segmentation, 5 J. Pub. Econ. Theory 1, 2 (2003) ("The reason
agents are interested in joining social groups is that these groups may serve to allocate
goods or services not traded on markets. Exchanging friendship, communicating in-
formation about job search and business opportunities, providing mutual aid or insur-
ance constitute many examples of these forms of allocation.").
Mine is not the first paper to hypothesize that strategic behavior occurs in the club
goods setting. Fernando Jaramillo, Hubert Kempf, and Fabien Moizeau have specu-
lated briefly that individuals may engage in wasteful conspicuous consumption as a
means of signaling wealth to potential clubs, who would invite these consumers to join
their high-status clubs based on a belief that a willingness to engage in conspicuous
consumption indicates a willingness to contribute to club goods. Fernando Jaramillo
et al., Conspicuous Consumption, Social Status and Clubs 18 (Fondazione Eni Enrico
Mattei, Working Paper No. 58.2000, 2000), available at http://www.feem.it/NR/
rdonlyres/30AB65BF-E91C-4F9E-AC5D-63033F4C2AA8/254/5800.pdf ("[W]e could
see the signalling problem in a very different way: the observable item could be the
individual contribution to the club, on which is based the society's inference over in-
dividual income and therefore on social status. In other words you contribute to the
New York Yacht Club not because you like sailing but for snobbish reasons only: just
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tion is made, and the law attempts to restrict certain types of exclu-
sion that are demanded by some consumers, exclusionary ameni-
ties become inevitable.
A. Understanding Exclusionary Club Goods
I define an "exclusionary club good, 48 as a collective good that is
paid for by all members of a club, at least in part because willing-
ness to pay for the good in question functions as an effective proxy
for other desired membership characteristics. In the residential set-
ting, exclusionary club goods function to engender homogeneity
among neighborhood residents with respect to any particular char-
acteristic, and prevent the neighborhood's population from reflect-
ing the heterogeneity that exists in the larger community with re-
spect to that characteristic. As with other forms of club goods,
exclusionary club goods are somewhat rivalrous and excludable.
Demand for exclusivity helps fuel demand for an exclusionary club
good, along with inherent demand for the club good itself. Al-
though not all club goods entail social interactions among fellow
users, exclusionary club goods often do, for reasons that I will be
explain shortly.49
To function as an effective sorting device, an exclusionary club
good must be both relatively expensive and relatively visible. If the
to show off your fortune. It is then social segmentation into clubs which serves as the
suJ port of status discrimination or social segmentation into statuses.").
A quick note on terminology: My use of "exclusionary" to describe the club goods
in question does not indicate that the exclusion mechanism has anything to do with
trespass law (the body of property law that protects the right to exclude most di-
rectly). Rather, exclusionary club goods are exclusionary in the same way that "exclu-
sionary zoning" is exclusionary-the end result of either strategy will be a community
in which the citizens targeted for exclusion are poorly represented. Similarly, I refer
to "inclusionary club goods" later in the paper. These club goods are inclusionary in
the same way that "inclusionary zoning" is. Inclusionary zoning typically encompasses
strategies designed to make a community more attractive to lower-income residents.
For further discussion of exclusionary and inclusionary zoning, see Peter H. Schuck,
Diversity in America: Keeping Government at a Safe Distance 203-27 (2003); David
J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2255, 2357-61 (2003); James C.
Clingermayer, Heresthetics and Happenstance: Intentional and Unintentional Exclu-
sionary Impacts of the Zoning Decision-making Process, 41 Urb. Stud. 377 (2003);
Robert C. Ellickson, The Irony of "Inclusionary" Zoning, 54 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1167
(1981); and Lawrence Gene Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal
Protection, and the Indigent, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 767, 780-85 (1969).
41 See infra text accompanying notes 65-69.
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club good in question is too cheap, then the decision to join a par-
ticular community might not be affected substantially by its pres-
ence. A "cheap" club good may engender homogeneity through
the operation of focal points, but it will not have any sorting ef-
fects. If, on the other hand, the club good is relatively expensive,
such that an undesired residential purchaser will conceptualize it as
a high differential tax without any associated benefit, then it may
convince the undesired purchaser to buy a home in a community
that does not provide the club good in question. Similarly, a club
good that is invisible or that does not predictably attract purchasers
with particular characteristics will not operate as an effective focal
point." Homogeneity will result from sorting and focal point
mechanisms acting in concert.
To consumers about to make the most important investments of
their lifetimes, the synergy between sorting and focal points may
prove critical, and this may explain the preference for an expensive
club good over a cheap focal point alone. To the extent that focal
point messages are misinterpreted, see their meaning change over
time, or reach an audience without particularly widespread prefer-
ences for homogeneity, the presence of an expensive sorting device
will be a critical guarantee that a homogenous population will arise
in the first instance and be maintained through multiple genera-
tions of buyers. 1
Exclusionary club goods are rarely employed in circumstances
where more straightforward mechanisms for exclusion are legally
permissible and normatively uncontroversial. For example, resi-
dential communities in the United States are permitted by law to
discriminate against convicted sex offenders who present high risks
of recidivism. 2 Citizens may, understandably, have a strong prefer-
0 A large body of real estate law mandates that sellers disclose various attributes of
their property to potential purchasers. As the analysis above suggests, various forms
of mandatory disclosure may have the unintended consequence of promoting residen-
tial homogeneity.
" The implicit assumption here is that preferences for certain types of common
amenities are more stable over time than linguistic signals, which are the cheapest
tools in a focal point strategy, but might see their meanings change radically, thanks
to linguistic reclamation, government actions, or other behavioral shifts. For a discus-
sion of efforts to shift the social meaning of particular communications, see Lessig,
supra note 18, at 1010-14, 1041-42.
People v. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769, 776-84 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); Mulligan v. Panther
Valley Prop. Owners Ass'n, 766 A.2d 1186, 1192-94 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
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ence for excluding such individuals from their neighborhoods, 3 but
the legality of overt discrimination renders it inefficient for a com-
munity to invest in exclusionary amenities that would be attractive
to non-sex offenders, but unattractive to sex offenders." Instead,
communities use covenants or even local ordinances to exclude sex
offenders.5 Similarly, when a developer seeks to fill a market niche
by creating a common interest community devoted to housing
members of a politically disfavored group, employing exclusionary
amenities would be overkill. The cheaper alternative of a focal
point alone should suffice to establish residential homogeneity
within the common interest community. Thus, the Palms of Mana-
sota, the nation's first retirement community for homosexuals,
need not invest in exclusionary amenities to keep heterosexual re-
tirees from residing there. 6 Anti-gay sentiment alone is sufficiently
powerful among straight seniors to prevent integration.
When club members or real estate developers have a preference
for excluding members of protected classes, the number of avail-
able options shrinks. For example, African Americans and mem-
bers of all other racial groups are protected by various laws de-
signed to combat discrimination in the housing sector. 7 Such laws
reach not only refusals to sell or lease but also the ability of land-
lords or sellers to advertise in a racially discriminatory manner. 8
This body of law substantially constrains a developer's choice of
51 See, e.g., David Herbert, Neighbors Pressure Sex Offender to Move, Mountain
View Voice, Sept. 10, 2004, at 1 (describing the decline in property values and
neighborhood opposition that occurred after one sex offender moved into a common
interest community), available at http://www.mv-voice.com/morgue/2004/
2004 09 10.chavez.shtml.
14 It is not difficult to imagine a club good that might provide a good proxy for sex
offender status. Community members might make extremely heavy investments in
school child-abuse-awareness programs or domestic violence police as a way of dis-
couraging dangerous sex offenders from settling in a particular community.
" Betsy Blaney, Safe at Home: Lubbock Company Creating Sex Offender-Free
Subdivision, Ft. Worth Star-Telegram, June 7, 2005, at B5, available at 2005 WLNR
15620575; Stephanie Simon, Ex-Cons Exiled to Outskirts, L.A. Times, Dec. 5, 2002, at
Al.
'6 Debra Rosenberg, A Place of Their Own, Newsweek, Jan. 15, 2001, at 54.
5 See supra note 3.
Ross D. Petty et al., Regulating Target Marketing and Other Race-Based Adver-
tising Practices, 8 Mich. J. Race & L. 335, 373-77 (2003); Robert G. Schwemm, Dis-
criminatory Housing Statements and § 3604(c): A New Look at the Fair Housing
Act's Most Intriguing Provision, 29 Fordham Urb. L.J. 187, 191 (2001).
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human models in housing advertisements by imposing liability on
landlords whose advertisements feature exclusively Caucasian
models.59 Indeed, in some respects, housing advertising is more
tightly regulated than the sale or leasing of housing. For example,
the Fair Housing Act permits "mom and pop" landlords to refuse
to lease certain apartments to tenants on the basis of race, but bars
those same landlords from advertising their discriminatory prefer-
ences with respect to said apartment.' Deprived of "efficient, 61
tools of discrimination, such as racist refusals to deal or advertise-
ments, those with a preference for discrimination may explore less
"efficient" strategies that the law does not proscribe.62 Exclusionary
amenities may become a viable option under such circumstances.
9 Ragin v. N.Y. Times, 923 F.2d 995, 1000-02 (2d Cir. 1991).6042 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2) (2000); see also Petty et al., supra note 58, at 376. The Sev-
enth Circuit has held that a nineteenth-century federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1982, bars
racial discrimination by Mrs. Murphy landlords. Morris v. Cizek, 503 F.2d 1303, 1304
(7th Cir. 1974).
6 There may be a few senses in which exclusionary club goods strategies are more
efficient than overt discrimination in admission or advertising. First, adopting the ex-
clusionary club goods strategy may be less "in your face," or confrontational, than ex-
cluding members of undesired groups, and excluders may value this opportunity. See
supra note 28; cf. Clingermayer, supra note 48, at 382-83 (noting that exclusionary
zoning proponents rarely discuss racial segregation in public, even where segregation-
ist sentiments are motivating them, because such language "is generally not consid-
ered socially acceptable or politically correct" and may invite a lawsuit); De Serpa,
supra note 14, at 39 ("[P]eople are apt to be reluctant to admit, face to face, that the
characteristics of others are repulsive to them. As a consequence, the exclusion of in-
dividuals exhibiting certain characteristics evolves as a second best solution."). Sec-
ond, club members may want to attract members of disfavored groups who actually
loathe other members of their disfavored groups, because the presence of such "self-
hating" group members solidifies negative stereotypes about the excluded group or
provides cover against discrimination suits. To maximize this preference, overt dis-
crimination will be ineffective, but exclusionary club goods may be highly effective.
62 See Becker & Murphy, supra note 15, at 72. Formally, the federal Fair Housing
Act ("FHA") and Fair Housing Act Amendments ("FHAA") recognize disparate
impact claims. See Lapid-Laurel v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of the Twp. of Scotch
Plains, 284 F.3d 442, 466-67 (3d Cir. 2002); Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d
300, 304-07 (9th Cir. 1997). That said, FHA and FHAA claims are almost always
brought against local governments, as opposed to individual developers, perhaps be-
cause it is so easy for a developer to rebut a prima facie case of disparate impact by
pointing to a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action," such as consumer
demand, unconnected to exclusionary motives, for the club good in question. Gamble,
104 F.3d at 305; see also Lapid-Laurel, 284 F.3d at 467.
The leading FHA disparate impact case involving a non-governmental defendant is
Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale Coll., 237 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2000). In Hack, the
plaintiffs alleged that Yale's requirement that freshmen and sophomores live in co-
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B. Comparing Private Goods
To be sure, self-sorting occurs in many contexts.63 Developers
might distort the population of a new housing development by
providing larger-than-average kitchens (attracting gourmets) or
miniscule kitchens (attracting those who prefer to eat at restau-
rants). That said, there are two critical differences between self-
selection through these private goods and self-selection through
club goods.
The first distinction is sociological. Club goods often involve so-
cial interactions among the members who are entitled to use
them. ' Private goods, by contrast, typically involve more limited
social interactions.65 In a neighborhood comprised entirely of quiet
educational dormitories had a disparate impact on unmarried Orthodox Jews whose
religious convictions barred them from residing in co-ed environments. Id. at 88. The
plaintiffs complained that they were compelled to pay for dormitory rooms that they
did not and would not use. Id. The panel majority held that the plaintiffs failed to
state a claim under the FHA because they did not allege "that Yale's policy has re-
sulted in or predictably will result in under-representation of Orthodox Jews in Yale
housing." Id. at 91. The majority therefore determined that the plaintiffs failed to
state a prima facie case under the FHA. Even if they had shown a disparate impact,
however, the majority probably would have ruled in Yale's favor, finding that Yale's
interest in promoting gender-integration was non-discriminatory and reasonable. A
dissenting judge would have held that the plaintiffs could pursue a discriminatory im-
pact claim under the FHA's prohibition on religious discrimination. See id. at 104
(Moran, J., dissenting in part). Although the plaintiffs did not frame their argument as
such, an exclusionary club goods story implicitly underpinned their discrimination
claim.
63 Self-sorting has been studied in the employment context, where employers may
offer particular benefits as a means of preventing undesirable types from joining a
firm in instances where employees have asymmetric information. See, e.g., Peter C.
Coyte, Specific Human Capital and Sorting Mechanisms in Labor Markets, 51 S.
Econ. J. 469, 470-72 (1984). For recent applications of this idea to the legal literature
on executive compensation, see M. Todd Henderson & James C. Spindler, Corporate
Heroin: A Defense of Perks, Executive Loans, and Conspicuous Consumption, 93
Geo. L.J. 1835, 1867 (2005); Saul Levmore, Puzzling Stock Options and Compensa-
tion Norms, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1901, 1927-28 (2001).
, Marilyn Gardner, An Empty Nest-Now What?: Once the Kids Move Out, Cou-
ples Start to Ask Themselves What They Want in Life and How Much Space They
Need, Christian Sci. Monitor, Apr. 21, 2004, at 15, available at 2004 WLNR 1649524;
see also Ronald T. Mitchelson & Michael T. Lazaro, The Face of the Game: African
Americans' Spatial Accessibility to Golf, 44 Southeastern Geographer 48, 70 (2004)
("The golf course can be a wonderful landscape of intense social and environmental
interaction.").
' Common amenities that do not promote social interactions among neighbors
would, by hypothesis, prove less attractive as exclusionary club goods. For example,
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shut-ins living in single-family homes, homeowners probably will
not care that much about the characteristics of their neighbors.' As
interactions among neighbors increase, we can expect that home-
owners will care more about the characteristics of their neighbors.
Club goods often become a locus of social activity within common
interest communities, offering additional dimensions in which in-
teractions can occur. For that reason, one might expect that people
will pay a greater premium for desirable neighbors in a community
offering many club goods than they would for desirable neighbors
in a community offering no club goods.67 One reason why racial
segregation is a public policy problem stems from the connection
between residential propinquity and the composition of individu-
als' social networks. 6 Residential segregation helps explain the seg-
regated nature of social interactions in public schools, political
gatherings, and some workplaces.69 Neighborhood residential seg-
regation is also associated with declines in generalized trust, an
economic resource that drives people's willingness to cooperate
one would not expect to see garbage collection services, gardening services, or maid
services functioning as exclusionary amenities with great frequency.
6 To the extent that they do care, they will care because of a belief that their succes-
sors in interest will have more substantial interactions with neighbors, and the compo-
sition of a neighborhood may affect the home's resale value. See Dawkins, supra note
26, at 391.
67The social nature of many club goods also allows prospective purchasers to obtain
information about neighborhood composition at a low cost. See supra text following
note 25. By contrast, in a neighborhood with neither common spaces nor front
porches, it may be difficult for a prospective purchaser to discover the characteristics
of the neighborhood's residents.
Lee Sigelman et al., Making Contact? Black-White Social Interaction in an Urban
Setting, 101 Am. J. Soc. 1306, 1324-26 (1996). For a discussion of other troubling im-
plications of homogeneity within common interest communities, see McKenzie, supra
note 4, at 188-92.
69 Charles T. Clotfelter, Spatial Rearrangement and the Tiebout Hypothesis: The
Case of School Desegregation, 42 S. Econ. J. 263, 268 (1975) (noting that whites' op-
position to residential integration increases when they believe that residential integra-
tion will result in the desegregation of local public schools); Yannis M. Ioannides &
Linda Datcher Loury, Job Information Networks, Neighborhood Effects, and Ine-
quality, 42 J. Econ. Literature 1056, 1071-82 (2004); Wilfred G. Marston & Thomas L.
Van Valey, The Role of Residential Segregation in the Assimilation Process, 441 An-
nals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 13, 16-17 (1979). But cf. Timothy Bledsoe et al.,
Residential Context and Racial Solidarity Among African Americans, 39 Am. J. Pol.
Sci. 434, 451-53 (1995) (finding that residence in integrated neighborhoods and in-
creased social contact with whites may decrease social solidarity among African
Americans).
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economically or socially with strangers." More troubling still, resi-
dential segregation is strongly associated with adherence to nega-
tive racial stereotypes, and selection effects only explain part of the
heightened animosity toward minorities in overwhelmingly white
neighborhoods.7' If there were no social interactions among
neighbors, then it would be hard to get upset about residential seg-
regation. Residential segregation is a public policy concern pre-
cisely because we know that interactions among neighbors are of-
ten frequent and take on substantial political and economic
importance.
The second distinction is economic. Private goods are exclud-
able. Hence, where the law sees no variation in kitchen sizing, it
might examine the costs and benefits of permitting variance, 71 and
perhaps mandate variance if the cost-benefit calculus suggests that
an invidious motive is at work. Semi-excludable club goods present
more difficult issues. With those goods, there may be a very good
reason for requiring that each individual contribute toward the
good in question. In the absence of such a mandate, residents who
value the good could have strong incentives to try to free ride on
their neighbors' contributions. The strength of this justification for
mandatory membership in the non-excludable goods context can
provide excellent cover for bad acts.73 Thus the legal system usually
will have a great deal of difficulty discerning which club goods are
motivated by a desire to solve a collective action problem and
which are motivated by more nefarious objectives.
7Melissa J. Marschall & Dietlind Stolle, Race and the City: Neighborhood Context
and the Development of Generalized Trust, 26 Pol. Behav. 125, 139-44 (2004).
7 1 j. Eric Oliver & Janelle Wong, Intergroup Prejudice in Mutliethnic Settings, 47
Am. J. Pol. Sci. 567, 577-80 (2003); see also Donald R. Kinder & Tali Mendelberg,
Cracks in American Apartheid: The Political Impact of Prejudice Among Desegre-
gated Whites, 57 J. Pol. 402,420 (1995) (finding strong correlations between residence
in largely white communities and adherence to negative stereotypes about African
Americans). But cf. Marschall & Stolle, supra note 70, at 131-32 (reviewing the evi-
dence that supports and conflicts with these findings).
" Variance in this context means a development with both large and small kitchens.
13 This explains why plaintiffs asserting disparate impact claims under the Fair Hous-
ing Act would face an uphill battle if they attacked a private developer's use of exclu-
sionary amenities. See supra note 62.
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C. Exclusionary Club Goods in Action
To date, the discussion has been rather abstract. Are there real-
world instances of developers using exclusionary club good strate-
gies? An example from the Washington, D.C., suburbs suggests an
affirmative answer. At the very least, this example shows that de-
velopers are conscious of the ways in which the presence or ab-
sence of communal amenities can deter certain groups of undesired
residents from joining a new common interest community, and that
targeted consumers understand those messages."
Falls Church, Virginia, like many suburban communities, has
had trouble keeping its tax burden low while maintaining high
quality public schools for its residents. 5 One way of satisfying both
objectives involves trying to limit the development of new housing
that is attractive to families with children. To that end, the Falls
Church government permitted Waterford Development to build
Broadway, an eighty-unit condominium, but gave the developer a
financial incentive to ensure that no more than eight school chil-
dren moved into the complex.76 For the ninth child living in Broad-
"This paper focuses on developers' .uses of exclusionary club goods, as opposed to
decisions by populated common interest communities to add exclusionary club goods.
Barzel and Sass provide an illuminating explanation for why one might expect to see
developers making decisions about common amenities, instead of leaving this decision
to residents. Yoram Barzel & Tim R. Sass, The Allocation of Resources by Voting,
105 Q. J. Econ. 745, 764-65 (1990). They argue that creating expensive common
amenities in a preexisting community will generate substantial controversy, especially
where residents will derive differential utility from these amenities. Complex voting
procedures will be needed to resolve these disputes, particularly in common-interest
communities that have homes of different sizes and values. Id. at 765-70.
My account is consistent with Barzel and Sass's, although it supplements it in im-
portant ways. Demand for certain common-interest communities may sort potential
residents of a community in many ways, potentially contributing to homogeneities be-
yond a common desire for the amenity in question. Thus, developers may create
common amenities at the outset, not only because creating such amenities would be
more difficult down the road, but also because the absence of such an amenity at the
outset will cause potential purchasers who would like that amenity to purchase else-
where instead. Indeed, it may be that the presence of certain common amenities pro-
motes homogeneity across a number of dimensions, and these forms of homogeneity
lend themselves to less contentious governance within common-interest communities.
" See John J. Delaney, Addressing the Workforce Housing Crisis in Maryland and
Throughout the Nation, 33 U. Bait. L. Rev. 153, 175 (2004).
76 Peter Whoriskey, No Kids? That's No Problem: Falls Church's Deal With Builder
Highlights Area School Crowding, Wash. Post, May 25, 2003, at Al. I thank Lee
Fennell for bringing the Falls Church incident to my attention.
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way, and every additional child beyond nine, the developer would
have to pay Falls Church $15,000." The developer agreed to pay
such fees for the first five years of the development's life.78
A Washington Post article described the Broadway developer's
response:
The president of Waterford Development, Jan A. Zachariasse,
said he was happy to accommodate the city to win approval of
the building, which is under construction on Route 7 at the cen-
ter of the city.
Coming in under the eight-child ceiling was easy, he said, be-
cause a building's demographics can be shaped simply by choos-
ing the right amenities. The Broadway, for example, has a cozy
library and a clubroom with a billiard table and bar. It does not
have a playroom.
Once the deal was signed, "I then could steer the project in a
certain direction to maximize or minimize the number of chil-
dren," Zachariasse said. "You didn't have to be a brain surgeon
to decide which way to go.
79
The developer provided a library and bar, but failed to provide a
playroom, making the condominium more attractive to childless
residents and less attractive to families. A real estate agent who
sold units in the development noted that families with many chil-
dren never even inquired about living in the Broadway.'
" Id.
78 Id.79 Id.
'0 Id. ("'We haven't had any inquiries from people with lots of kids. It's kind of like
how water seeks its own level. It just happens."') (quoting real estate agent Mary Al-
ice Kaplan). In other contexts, housing consumers with a choice of suburbs seem to
understand that the choice of common sporting activities entails a choice about the
nature of one's neighbors and social networks. A New York Times series on class in
America quoted a homeowner's description of his Atlanta suburb and the role tennis
played in organizing social interactions:
"The good thing about it is that it is a very comfortable neighborhood to live
in.... These are very homogeneous types of groups. You play tennis with them,
you have them over to dinner. You go to the same parties.
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It should not be particularly surprising that developers under-
stand how to use exclusionary club goods. The more surprising as-
pect of this story is Zachariasse's willingness to discuss his actions
and motivations so candidly with a Washington Post correspon-
dent. Zachariasse later regretted his candor, no doubt, when the
Department of Housing and Urban Development launched an in-
vestigation into Falls Church and Waterford Development for vio-
lating the Fair Housing Act by intentionally discriminating against
families with children.8 The investigation ultimately resulted in a
settlement, whereby Falls Church agreed to alter the way in which
it collects school impact fees from developers, and the developers
agreed to devote $120,000 toward a fair housing partnership that
would provide training for the developer's employees to avoid fur-
ther discrimination against families with children.'
Following this investigation and settlement, one expects that de-
velopers will be more tight-lipped when discussing the motivations
behind their provision of amenities in residential developments.
This raises a serious problem. How are agencies charged with en-
forcing antidiscrimination laws to ensure that the laws are not
thwarted through exclusionary amenities strategies once develop-
ers learn from Zachariasse's mistake and instead offer pretextual
but plausible explanations for the provision of exclusionary club
goods?
There are two reasonable responses to this question. One possi-
ble, and perhaps appropriate, response is to do nothing. For rea-
sons I will identify in the Conclusion, this will sometimes be the
best approach in light of the danger that the cure for exclusionary
amenities will be even worse than the disease. This is an unsatisfy-
ing approach, however, in those instances where developers un-
dermine antidiscrimination laws that reflect important normative
commitments.
".... When you talk about tennis, guess what? Everybody you play against
looks and acts and generally feels like you. It doesn't give you much of a
perspective."
Peter T. Kilborn, The Five-Bedroom, Six-Figure Rootless Life, N.Y. Times, June 1,
2005, at Al.
"I See Press Release No. 04-142, U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., HUD Settles
Investigation of Falls Church and Condo Developers (Nov. 19, 2004),
htp://www.hud.gov/news/release.cfm?content=pr04-142.cfm.
Id.
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A second possible response is to try to identify club goods that
seem particularly susceptible to exclusionary strategies, and then
devote careful scrutiny to developers' use of those goods. In the
Section that follows, I will identify a few trends in the residential
golf course industry and raise the possibility that residential golf
courses sometimes have functioned as exclusionary club goods,
with African Americans as the undesired group targeted for exclu-
sion.
D. Golf and Race in the United States
During the 1990s, one could predict with a high degree of accu-
racy a person's race upon learning that he or she played golf.
Among warm weather leisure activities attracting twenty-five mil-
lion or more participants, golf stood out as the most racially segre-
gated. From 1994 to 1995, 27.7 million Caucasian Americans
played golf-approximately 16.9% of all Caucasians aged fifteen
and older.' By contrast, only 900,000 African Americans played
golf during that timeframe, comprising just 4.2% of the African
American population. ' After adjusting the size of these groups to
reflect the general population of the United States, we see that
93.4% of all golfers were Caucasian, 3.1% were African American,
and 3.4% classified themselves as "other," a group that includes
Latinos and Asian Americans." More recent data suggests that Af-
rican American golfers played fewer rounds of golf than Caucasian
golfers did, which would skew the participation data even further.'
83 R. Jeff Teasley et al., Recreation and Wilderness in the United States 20 (Univ. of
Ga. Dep't of Agric. & Applied Econ., Working Paper No. 97-13, 1997), available at
ht!p://www.agecon.uga.edu/-erag/finalreport.htm.
Id.
Id. Data from a 1997 study showed an even more substantial gap in participation.
In that year, 2.7% of African Americans played golf, compared with 12.6% of Cauca-
sians. Jill Lieber, Golf Finally Reaching Out, USA Today, Aug. 15, 2001, at 1C (quot-
ing statistics from a 1997 study by the National Golf Foundation). For an explanation
of the various possible causes of low minority participation in golf, see Paul H. Gob-
ster, Explanations for Minority "Underparticipation" in Outdoor Recreation: A Look
at Golf, 16 J. Park & Recreation Admin. 46, 48-49 (1998).86 See Nat'l Golf Found., Minority Golf Participation in the U.S. 6 (2003) (noting
that the average golfer played 19.2 rounds during the previous year, whereas the av-
erage African American golfer played 13.9 rounds during the previous year). Some
caution is in order in interpreting this data, however. African American golf participa-
tion increased during the first few years of the millennium, and it may be that an in-
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The data suggests that, during the 1990s, golf was a substantially
better proxy for race than income and a somewhat better proxy
than household wealth.' That differential is critical. After all, if in-
come provided a better proxy for race than golf participation did,
those interested in residential racial homogeneity could use large
lot sizes or occupancy restrictions to exclude African Americans.
This strategy-referred to in the literature as "exclusionary zon-
flux of new African American golfers explains the lower intensity of participation. See
infra text accompanying note 177.
" In 1995, 19.6% of Caucasians lived in households with annual incomes in excess
of $75,000, whereas 8.1% of African Americans lived in such households. See Bureau
of the Census, Money Income in the United States: 1995, at 11-12, in Current Popula-
tion Reports P60-193 (Sept. 1996), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2/
pop/p60/p60-193.pdf. Thus, Caucasians were 2.4 times as likely as African Americans
to have household incomes above $75,000 per year, but four times as likely to play
golf. Income inequality between Caucasians and African Americans has been dimin-
ishing consistently over time. See Bureau of the Census, Measuring 50 Years of Eco-
nomic Change Using the March Current Population Survey C-7 tbl.C-4 (1998); see
also Farley & Frey, supra note 4, at 30 ("ITlhe percentage of blacks with economic
status qualifying them for expensive housing.., increased during the 1980s."). During
the 1980s and 1990s, the racial gap between blacks and whites participating in white
collar jobs declined dramatically. In 1980, 36.6% of blacks and 53.9% of whites were
in white-collar occupations. In 2000, 51.3% of blacks and 62.6% of whites were in
white-collar occupations. Marshall H. Medoff, Revisiting the Economic Hypothesis
and Positional Segregation, 32 Rev. Black Pol. Econ. 83, 91 (2004).
Wealth is more racially skewed than income in the United States, a result partially
due to decreasing marginal consumption as incomes rise, demographic variables, asset
allocation decisions, and disproportionate demands for assistance from low-income
family members faced by higher-income African Americans. Joseph G. Altonji et al.,
Black/White Differences in Wealth, 24 Econ. Persp. 38, 38, 48-49 (2000); N. S. Chiteji
& Darrick Hamilton, Family Connections and the Black-White Wealth Gap Among
Middle-Class Families, 30 Rev. Black Pol. Econ. 9, 21-25 (2002). Wealth differentials,
like income differentials, appear to be less dramatic than golfing participation differ-
entials. See, e.g., Sharmila Choudhury, Racial and Ethnic Differences in Wealth and
Asset Choices, 64 Soc. Security Bull. 1, 8 tbl.3 (2002) (noting that a white household
in the top income quartile had $551,818 in mean net worth, whereas a black house-
hold in the top income quartile had $247,555 in mean net worth). Between 1969 and
1995, the percentage of Southern Caucasians in the top three U.S. wealth quintiles
stayed constant at 60%, while the percentage of Southern African Americans in this
group increased from 27.6% to 34.6%. See MDC, Inc., Income and Wealth in the
South: A State of the South Interim Report 10, chart 10 (1998). Moreover, among
high-income, middle-aged college graduates, wealth disparities between Caucasian
and African American families disappear. See Ronald L. Straight, Survey of Con-
sumer Finances: Asset Accumulation Differences by Race, 29 Rev. Black Pol. Econ.
67, 76-77 (2001). If one adjusts for age, income, education, and employment, interra-
cial differences in wealth tend to disappear. Id. at 80.
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ing"-is well documented and widely practiced.' But once substan-
tial numbers of African American families achieve higher incomes
and higher wealth, exclusionary zoning strategies lose their effec-
tiveness. Notably, during the 1980s and 1990s, the United States
saw a substantial exodus of African Americans into the suburbs.89
Given the illegality of alternative discrimination strategies, con-
struction of an expensive, racially polarizing amenity may provide
the next-"best" strategy for keeping these upwardly mobile Afri-
can Americans out of particular communities.
Golfing facilities constituted an especially attractive exclusionary
club good for developers during the 1990s because it was difficult
to find any activity in which participation was as racially polarized
as golf. First, other land-based, warm weather sports were far more
racially integrated. For example, African Americans comprised
13.6% of joggers, 8.2% of bicyclists, 15.5% of baseball players,
19.1% of basketball players, 8.3% of soccer players, and 12.6% of
volleyball players.' Even tennis, stereotypically a leisure activity
with low levels of African American participation, attracted a
rather integrated playing population. Fully 8.2% of tennis partici-
pants were African American, and participation rates were not
starkly different among the races."
Second, sports that exhibited the same level of racial segregation
as golf tended to be either extreme, aquatic, or snow-based, most
of which are far less popular than golf. The only warm water sport
with a greater percentage of Caucasian participants was water ski-
ing, which attracted approximately half as many participants as golf
did, and for which 94.4% of participants were Caucasian. Motor
boating attracted more participants than golf, but was slightly less
segregated, with 92.5% of participants identifying as Caucasian,
and 3.3% of participants identifying as African American. Rock
8 See supra note 48.
8 See Bledsoe et al., supra note 69, at 440; Medoff, supra note 87, at 91 ("By 1999,
the number of blacks living in a suburb outside a central city was nearly eleven mil-
lion, or more than 30% of the total black population, as compared to 9% in 1980."
(citation omitted)). Note, however, that suburbanization did not end racial segrega-
tion. Many African Americans moved into deteriorating inner suburbs that were be-
coming majority African American. See Darden & Kamel, supra note 24, at 105.
91 Teasley et al., supra note 83, at 20-21.
9, Id. at 21. The tennis participation rates were as follows: 10.8% of Caucasians;
7.8% of African Americans; and 12.8% of "Others." Id.
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climbing exhibited a similar skew, but drew only 7.5 million par-
ticipants in 1994-95.92 Similarly, 94.9% of cross-country skiers were
Caucasian, but the sport drew less than 7 million participants.93
Third, the nature of golf renders it a more attractive exclusion-
ary good: golf courses are quite expensive to develop and maintain
(unlike, for example, rock climbing walls);9 4 they can be built in vir-
tually any climate (unlike cross-country skiing courses or marinas);
they can be enjoyed by virtually any age demographic (again,
unlike rock climbing walls); and they do not generate potentially
welfare-reducing noise externalities (unlike marinas that house
motor boats). 95
Finally, golf was historically associated with racial exclusion
and played at country clubs that had discriminatory membership
policies. 96 As a result, golf has an "image as 'a white man's
92 Id. at 24-25.
93Id. at 23.
9
,W. J. Florkowski & G. Landry, An Economic Profile of Golf Courses in Georgia:
Course and Landscape Maintenance 4 (Ga. Agric. Experiment Stations Research Re-
port No. 681, 2002) (noting that the average maintenance expenditure-not including
land acquisition costs and property taxes-for a Georgia golf course was $417,042 per
year); J. Richard McElyea et al., Golf's Real Estate Value, Urb. Land, Feb. 1991, at
14 (noting the cost of constructing an 18-hole golf course to range from $2 to $8 mil-
lion).
"' Club goods are not the only means of sorting residents. Saul Levmore suggested
to me that common interest communities conceivably could achieve the same ends
through direct subsidies for "sorting" activities, as opposed to club goods provision.
For example, a homeowners' association might provide a subsidy of up to $5000 per
household for rock climbing expenses, and tax all homeowners equally to pay for this
subsidy. Presumably, African Americans would be as deterred by this approach as
they would be by a residential golf community with a $5000 annual mandatory mem-
bership fee. In light of my theory, why are such arrangements not present in the real
world? The puzzling absence of these arrangements is probably explained by legal
doctrine. Covenants and equitable servitudes that do not "touch and concern" the
land do not bind successors in interest under American property law. Affirmative
promises to pay money for common amenities located within a development, such as
communal golf courses, have long been held to "touch and concern" the land, but af-
firmative promises to pay money for rock climbing or other activity subsidies pre-
sumably would not satisfy the "touch and concern" requirement. See Anthony v. Brea
Glenbrook Club, 130 Cal. Rptr. 32, 34-35 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); Streams Sports Club,
Ltd. v. Richmond, 457 N.E.2d 1226, 1230-31 (I11. 1983); Regency Homes Ass'n v.
Egermayer, 498 N.W.2d 783, 791-93 (Neb. 1993); Homsey v. Univ. Gardens Racquet
Club, 730 S.W.2d 763, 764 (Tex. App. 1987).
96 Calvin H. Sinnette, Forbidden Fairways: African Americans and the Game of
Golf 58-60, 121-32 (1998); Mitchelson & Lazaro, supra note 64, at 48-51.
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game."' To the extent that communities wished to employ ra-
cially discriminatory selection mechanisms using exclusionary
club goods, golf presented the best opportunities.' Given the ra-
cial dynamics of golfing in the United States, a residential devel-
opment built around a high-quality, mandatory membership golf
course would have attracted two types of residents: avid golfers
(who were overwhelmingly white), and people with a preference
for living among avid golfers or other non-golfers attracted to
such communities. It is therefore worth investigating the exclu-
sionary amenities hypothesis by examining statistics on golf
course-related residential developments.
E. Golf Course Developments in the United States
A residential golf course is a golf course surrounded by residen-
tial properties-single family homes, townhouses, or condomini-
ums. During the 1990s, golf participation intensified,' and the
United States saw a rapid increase in the number of residential golf
course developments."° By 2000, forty percent of current golf
course construction was residential, and the growth rate of residen-
tial golf courses far outpaced the growth rate for real estate devel-
opments in general."' In Florida, which has more golf courses than
9 James D. Davidson, Social Differentiation and Sports Participation: The Case of
Golf, in Social Approaches to Sport 181, 200 (Robert M. Pankin ed., 1982).98 This view is premised on the idea that golfers are at least somewhat evenly spread
across income levels. If, by contrast, all African American golfers were wealthy, then
residential golf courses would not provide an effective means of engaging in the ex-
clusionary club goods strategy. The best available data indicates that the household
incomes of African American golfers skew slightly higher than those of Caucasian
golfers, but the difference is not particularly pronounced. Nat'l Golf Found., supra
note 86, at 16.
"The number of Americans who played one round or more per year declined from
27,800,000 in 1990 to 26,446,000 in 1999. U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of
the United States: 2001, at 761 tbl.1244 (2001). These Americans played golf more
frequently, however, as the total number of golf rounds played increased from
502,000,000 to 564,100,000 during the same period, a 12% increase. Id.
'" John L. Crompton, Designing Golf Courses to Optimize Proximate Property
Values, 5 Managing Leisure 192,192-93 (2000).
01 Id. at 193 ("While the real estate industry in the United States as a whole grew at
an annual rate of 2-3% in the 1990s, the annual growth rate of developments which
incorporated golf courses approached 10%, making it one of the hottest sectors in
real estate."). Some recent evidence suggests that the construction of new residential
golf courses has declined of late. See Kevin Allison, Golf Comes Out of the Bunker,
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any other state, as many as fifty-four percent of golf courses were
residential' 02
It would be inappropriate to assert at this juncture that the ex-
clusionary club good phenomenon I have identified is largely re-
sponsible for this boom in residential golf courses. Alternative ex-
planations cannot and should not be discounted. However, an
investigation into the growth of residential golf communities re-
veals several intriguing data points, all of which are consistent with
the hypothesis that exclusionary club goods strategies were respon-
sible for some of the changes and growth in the residential golf
course market.
The first intriguing data point concerns the shifting mix of man-
datory golf course memberships and optional memberships offered
to residents of residential golf communities. Early residential golf
course developments followed a particular financing model: Those
who purchased residences in the development were obligated to
purchase "equity memberships" in the adjoining golf course. 3 In
this arrangement, all homeowners would pay for the development
and maintenance of the course, regardless of their utilization of it.
In the mid- to late-1990s, however, the market shifted somewhat,
with developers increasingly embracing semi-private golf course
developments, where membership is optional among homeowners
and members of the public can play for a daily use fee.'
Two groups of golf courses did not shift away from equity mem-
berships: high end courses played by the very wealthy, and courses
located in areas with large African American populations, such as
Fin. Times, Feb. 1, 2005, at 10, available at 2005 WLNR 1341985. This is consistent
with the exclusionary club goods hypothesis. See infra text accompanying notes 184-
186.
,"' John J. Haydu & Alan W. Hodges, Economic Impacts of the Florida Golf Course
Industry, Economic Information Report No. 02-4 (Univ. of Fla. Inst. of Food & Agric.
Sci., Gainesville, Fla.), June 13, 2002, at 1, 3; see also Lewis M. Goodkin, Out of the
Rough?, Florida Trend, Dec. 1998, at 78, 81 (quoting an earlier estimate that 40% of
Florida's golf courses are residential). In 1996, approximately one-third of all newly
constructed golf courses were residential. Jordan N. Roberts & Darla Domke-
Damonte, Utilization of Golf Course Facilities by Residents of Golf Course Commu-
nities in Myrtle Beach, 1 Coastal Bus. J. 13, 14 (2002), http://www.coastal.edu/
business/cbj/pdfs/golfcommunities.pdf.
"
3 Goodkin, supra note 102, at 78.
See, e.g., id. (discussing the emergence of this financing design in Florida).
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Broward and Miami-Dade counties. °" For wealthy homeowners,
mandatory golf course membership might have functioned in the
same way that the cooperative structure functioned in Manhat-
tan."° Wealthy people can afford to pay a premium for the per-
ceived benefits of exclusionary policies and are happy to do so. In-
stead of paying more for apartments and association governance
via the cooperative corporate form, these Floridians might have
opted for a luxury amenity that effectively excluded those unwill-
ing to pay substantial amounts for a world class golf facility.
To complete the story, consider the second intriguing data point:
Many purchasers who buy into residential golf courses do not play
golf. This phenomenon of non-golfer households in residential golf
communities-including those with "mandatory membership"
policies-has been widely noted in golf industry periodicals.'" To
be sure, not all of these people are overt racists or segregationists.
105 Id. at 80. According to the 2000 census, Miami-Dade and Broward have the larg-
est African American populations among Florida counties. Among Florida's large
counties, they rank second and third, respectively, in percentage of African American
residents. Duval County's population is 27.8% African American; Broward's is 20.5%
African American; and Miami-Dade's is 20.3% African American. Florida as a whole
is 14.6% African American. U.S. Census Bureau, County and City Data Book: 2000,
at 71 tbl.B-2 (2001).
106 See supra text accompanying notes 30-44.
107 See, e.g., McElyea et al., supra note 94, at 16 ("Golf-course-oriented homes ap-
peal to nongolfers as well as to golfers. (Only about one-third of golf-frontage home-
buyers in nonretirement projects play golf regularly.)"); Crompton, supra note 100, at
193; Stella M. Chavez, Subdivisions Want Residents to Join the Club, S. Fla. Sun-
Sentinel, Feb. 15, 2000, at Al; Goodkin, supra note 102 (quoting a developer's expec-
tation that "50% of buyers will be golfers"); Nancy Kressler Murphy, Golf Course
Communities Sprouting, Mercer Bus., June 1990, at 15 (quoting a New Jersey devel-
oper's statement that "[flifty percent of my buyers are golfers, and then 50 percent
have never picked up a club and never plan to"). This pattern of nongolfers buying
homes in residential golf communities persists today. See Robert Johnson, Golf
Homes Attract Even Those Who Don't Play, N.Y. Times, May 8, 2005, Real Estate at
15.
A cautionary note is in order. Although the above-cited sources suggest the pres-
ence of large numbers of nongolfers in all types of residential golf courses, I have
been unable to find data that breaks down the prevalence of non-golfers in mandatory
membership developments.
100But some of them probably are. A recent New York Times article discusses a
county in North Carolina where overwhelmingly white residential golf communities
are surrounded by overwhelmingly black unincorporated areas. The townships con-
taining the residential golf communities refuse to incorporate the largely black
neighborhoods and, as a result, the latter are left without the most basic municipal
services, such as garbage collection, piped water, and police protection. Shaila Dewan,
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2006] Exclusionary Amenities
Indeed, it is likely that many of these non-golfing residential golf
course dwellers are willing to pay a premium because they enjoy
the open space or low densities offered within golf course devel-
opments."n That said, real estate appraisal research suggests that
golf course views provide only one-third as much of an increase in
real estate values as views of a creek or marsh."' Artificial lakes
and waterways are cheaper to build and maintain than golf courses,
and add similar value,"1 though they are less of a mainstay of new
real estate developments than golf courses."' Rather surprisingly,
proximity to a golf course appears to add less to residential prop-
erty values than it does to commercial, industrial, institutional, or
agricultural properties."3 In short, golf courses qua golf courses add
less value to nearby or adjacent residences than one might expect.
So a desire for open space did not seem to be driving all the de-
mand for residential golf courses among non-golfers. Is there any
evidence for more insidious explanations? The marketing data ap-
pears to suggest that many non-golfer residents of residential golf
courses find the homogenous nature of these communities' popula-
tions appealing. D. Robert DeChaine has conducted the only sys-
In County Made Rich by Golf, Some Enclaves Are Left Behind, N.Y. Times, June 7,
2005, at Al.
o9 See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 107, at 15.
"o James R. Rinehart & Jeffrey J. Pompe, Estimating the Effect of a View on Unde-
veloped Property Values, 67 Appraisal J. 57, 60 (1999) ("The results show that ocean
views add 147% to lot values, location on a creek or marsh adds 115% to lot prices,
and golf course location adds 39% to lot values.").
. E-mail from Jim Kass, Research Director, National Golf Foundation, to Lior
Strahilevitz, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago School of Law (Feb.
15, 2005, 09:15:04 CST) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
"'? Even within residential golf courses, lots with views of water hazards are particu-
larly desirable and command the highest premiums. See Gregory L. Cory et al., Golf
Course Development in Residential Communities 37 fig.2-12 (2001); Crompton, supra
note 100, at 198.
13 Haydu & Hodges, supra note 102, at 23 ("Commercial, agricultural, industrial,
institutional, and government land use types all showed an increase in total value as-
sociated with golf courses, averaging $10,942 per parcel, and ranging from nearly
$20,00 [sic] for residential properties, $70,000 for commercial properties, $114,000 for
industrial, to nearly $121,000 for agricultural land."). This study included not only
residential golf communities, but homes near such communities, as well as those
within a mile of public courses, country club courses, and semi-private courses.
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tematic study of the ways in which residential golf communities
market themselves.' DeChaine noted the
recurring themes emphasized in the persuasive sales appeals for
golf community property. These themes included focus on the
"purity" of the community; the privacy and exclusivity of com-
munity membership; the safety, security, and serenity of a life-
style removed from the maddening crowds; the prestige of the
golf course as a community focal point; and the sense of freedom
afforded by spacious property and surroundings, among others."5
Marketing materials certainly discussed the quality of the golf
courses at length,"6 but DeChaine appeared to notice as much, if
not more, emphasis on the exclusivity of golf courses behind gates,
membership rules that limited outsiders' access to the property,
and the homogeneity of the community's residents."'
Advertisements for mandatory membership golf communities
sometimes provide not-so-subtle exclusionary messages. For ex-
ample, Harbour Ridge, a residential golf community in Stuart,
Florida, describes its community in the following manner:
Harbour Ridge Yacht & Country Club is a warm and friendly
community of 695 families. Every resident at Harbour Ridge is a
member of the Club, thus ensuring universal interest in the care
and integrity of the community and the club.
Members come from every section of the United States, Ger-
many, England, France and many other countries. They bring
with them the traditions of some of their nations', and the
"
4 D. Robert DeChaine, From Discourse to Golf Course: The Serious Play of Imag-
ining Community Space, 25 J. Comm. Inquiry 132 (2001). Sadly, for my purposes,
DeChaine did not distinguish between mandatory membership and optional member-
ship communities.
Id. at 134.
116 Id. at 138-39.
..
7 Id. at 139-43. DeChaine's analysis lacked a quantitative dimension, but his article
devoted far more space to discussions of exclusivity than discussions of golf quality. I
cannot determine whether this reflects a selection bias or a proportional treatment
based on the relative prevalence of developer rhetoric. It would also be helpful to
know the extent to which residential golf communities stress exclusivity more or less
than other gated communities do in their marketing materials.
[Vol. 92:437
Exclusionary Amenities
world's, great golf clubs. Members embrace traditional values
and are known to jealously guard their privacy and comfort. "8
Harbour Ridge's advertisement seems evocative enough to send
clear messages to prospective purchasers about the nature of the
community."9 Other residential golf communities opt for an even
less subtle approach, selecting names like "Magnolia Greens Golf
Plantation" or "Sea Trail Plantation.'2o
In some ways, this focus on exclusivity in marketing materials
should not be surprising. Even if non-golfers were to constitute a
small minority of members within mandatory membership residen-
tial golf communities, one would expect to see developers working
hard to try to attract them. After all, in some sense the golfers
within mandatory membership communities free ride off the con-
tributions by non-golfers for course upkeep. Someone who loved
playing golf, but did not have strong preferences for residential
homogeneity or heterogeneity, might rationally prefer to live in a
community where non-golf-playing mandatory members subsidized
his golfing. Easy access to tee times, a lack of crowding, and little
waiting on the course would all be attractive amenities to such
golfers.
Optional membership residential golf communities, by contrast,
should not have been expected to market themselves to non-
golfers with a preference for homogeneity. After all, an optional
membership residential community faces a tragedy of the com-
mons if too many non-golfers join it. The tragedy of the commons
arises when many people try to take advantage of the views and
open space provided by a golf course, but only those residents who
... GolfCourseHome.net, Harbour Ridge, Stuart, Florida, http://www.golfcoursehome.
net/doc/communities/Community-Harbourridge.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2006).
.. Harbour Ridge's Internet advertisements, like Jan Zachariasse's statements to a
reporter, might be sufficiently candid to invite scrutiny from HUD's attorneys. Cf.
Ragin v. N.Y. Times, 923 F.2d 995, 998-99 (2d Cir. 1991) (discussing subtle discrimi-
natory modeling in newspaper advertisement). A quick Internet survey suggested that
most advertising messages used by bundled membership communities do not violate
Fair Housing Act guidelines. In any event, it is interesting to note that the national
origin groups featured in Harbour Ridge's advertisement track those groups deemed
most desirable in infamous racially discriminatory appraiser's guides. For a discussion
of historic discrimination in real estate appraisal and lending, and citations to some of
these texts, see Peter P. Swire, The Persistent Problem of Lending Discrimination: A
Law and Economics Analysis, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 787, 793-99 (1995).20Mitchelson & Lazaro, supra note 64, at 69 (emphasis added).
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are members of the course pay for its upkeep. A residential com-
munity can solve this problem only by shifting toward some form
of mandatory membership or by permitting non-residents to use its
course, which potentially raises privacy, safety, or traffic concerns
for residents. 2'
There is one final piece of the puzzle. In order for this story to
work, it must be the case that Caucasian non-golfers seeking racial
homogeneity understood the demographics of golf participation.
Ideally, we would be able to access data from the 1990s about
white non-golfers' perceptions of who plays golf. Not surprisingly,
however, no one ever thought to ask such a question. That said,
James Loewen's fascinating book on residential exclusion in the
United States notes that, at least in the context of retirement com-
munities, both whites and blacks understood the connection be-
tween mandatory membership golf communities and residential ra-
cial homogeneity.22
This account of exclusionary club goods therefore provides a
testable hypothesis. Did optional membership residential golf
communities have higher percentages of African American resi-
dents than equivalent mandatory membership golf communities?
Given the prevalence of both types of communities in Florida, it is
12, For discussions of the heated debates that arise when optional-membership golf
communities try to solve this tragedy of the commons by mandating membership, see
Tal Abbady, No Change for Boca Lago: Mandatory Membership Voted Down, S. Fla.
Sun-Sentinel, May 12, 2004, at 8B; Leon Fooksman, Residents Fight Rule on Joining
Golf Club, S. Fla. Sun-Sentinel, Sept. 17, 2003, at 1B; Lee Hoke, Mandatory Member-
ships? Solution or Band-Aid?, Club Mgmt., Dec. 2004, at 18; Patty Pensa, Country
Club Battle Heads to Court: Community Split Over Required Membership, S. Fla.
Sun-Sentinel, Dec. 19, 2004, at 3B. On the privacy drawbacks of solving a tragedy of
the commons by opening up the golf course to outsiders, see Mary Shanklin, Golf
Communities Tee Off, Orlando Sentinel, Nov. 10, 1996, at J1.
'22 James W. Loewen, Sundown Towns: A Hidden Dimension of American Racism
392 (2005) ("Today the tradition of retiring to white enclaves continues, often gated
and built around private beaches, golf courses, marinas, or all three. They may pro-
vide community, because purchase of a house or town house includes use of a club-
house, restaurant, sports facilities, and other amenities.... While not quite racially
segregated, these new towns and developments advertise themselves as 'exclusive'
and are often overwhelmingly white, although race goes unmentioned."). Loewen
notes that African Americans who move into such communities may face social sanc-
tions from fellow African Americans. Id. at 318 ("A resident of an overwhelmingly
white neighborhood near a golf club in south Tulsa told me of a black doctor who
moved there. He had to move back to north Tulsa, she said, because 'his [black] pa-
tients rose up in protest."') (bracketed text in original).
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possible to answer this question, controlling for home prices, resi-
dent income, and other attributes.
In later empirical work, a co-author and I plan to test this hy-
pothesis using census and demographic data and to investigate
whether the racial composition of golf communities in general dif-
fered substantially from the racial composition of non-golf gated
communities. Although this future study will not allow us to disag-
gregate sorting and focal point mechanisms, it can nevertheless ad-
dress two questions: (1) whether mandatory membership residen-
tial golf courses have a racially disparate impact in the residential
setting; and (2) whether (as this Article hypothesizes) residential
golf communities are even more segregated than golf participation
is in general. This data, combined with the circumstantial evidence
outlined above, may raise a strong inference that developers ac-
tively pursued exclusionary club goods strategies.
Even if there were no intentional discrimination associated with
the bundling of golf with residences, the popularity of bundling
residential developments with participation in a costly activity that
exhibited dramatic racial skews should be particularly disconcert-
ing to those who worry about the effects of residential segregation.
The foregoing evidence suggests that, during the 1990s, residential
golf communities could have functioned as exclusionary amenities,
and may have facilitated substantial residential segregation if hous-
ing consumers were acting upon widespread preferences among
whites for residential racial homogeneity. Namely, such communi-
ties would have attracted three types of residents: (1) whites who
wanted racial homogeneity; (2) golfers who did not care about ra-
cial homogeneity, but were overwhelmingly white; and (3) whites
who did not care about racial homogeneity so much as a form of
cultural homogeneity. This latter group would be happy to live
with "assimilationist" African Americans-precisely those African
Americans who would make a conscious decision to live in over-
whelmingly white neighborhoods and participate in a sporting ac-
tivity that has historically been closed to blacks. 123 These sorting
123 See supra note 61. These latter residents might not object to the presence of an
African American celebrity, either. At least two highly prestigious golf-oriented coun-
try clubs have Michael Jordan as a member, though virtually no other African Ameri-
can members. See Marcia Chambers, The Changing Face of Private Clubs, Golf Dig.,
Aug. 2000, at 93, 100-01.
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and focal point mechanisms would have been reinforced by the be-
havior of middle- or upper-income African Americans who did not
want to pay for a costly resource that they were unlikely to use, did
not want to be the "token" family in an overwhelmingly white en-
vironment, or did not want to live in neighborhoods where they
would encounter hostility or social snubs from their neighbors.'
An exclusionary amenities strategy could enable all these effects to
operate in unison.
F. Other Examples of Exclusionary Amenities
Before ending this part of the discussion, it is worth noting the
possibility that exclusionary amenities might be used as part of a
less obnoxious strategy for promoting residential homogeneity.
Racial exclusion is, for very good reasons, regarded as more prob-
lematic than other forms of residential sorting. Communities some-
times employ exclusionary amenities strategies, however, to
achieve innocuous, or perhaps even beneficial, objectives.
1. Exclusionary Religious Goods
Suppose the existence of a religious minority- scattered within a
large metropolitan area. Suppose further that members of this reli-
gious minority value homogeneity in matters of faith and behavior,
and that they feel a critical mass of believers in a confined geo-
graphic space is necessary for the religious community to thrive."6
In such a setting, one might expect to see the community embrace
direct efforts to limit the entrance of nonbelievers into the com-
munity. For example, a homeowners' association might record
covenants barring property sales to people who are not members
"'For a discussion of the costs associated with being the lone African American
member of an overwhelmingly Caucasian golf club, see Chambers, supra note 123, at
100.
,25 See supra note 27.
For discussion along these lines, see Eduardo M. Pefialver, Property as Entrance,
91 Va. L. Rev. 1889, 1962-71 (2005). There is some evidence suggesting that religious
residential homogeneity may have some beneficial effects on social welfare, though
this data analyzes metropolitan-level homogeneity, as opposed to neighborhood-level
homogeneity. See Christopher G. Ellison et al., Religious Homogeneity and Metro-
politan Suicide Rates, 76 Soc. Forces 273, 287 (1997) (finding that religious homoge-
neity is associated with decreased suicide rates). For a critique of residential religious
sorting, see generally Samaha, supra note 6.
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of the religious community in question. Alas, such restraints on
alienation have been invalidated by courts as contrary to public
policy.'27
Reliance on exclusionary amenities may provide an alternative
strategy. In such a scheme, the community would place a large reli-
gious temple at the center of the community and require all home-
owners within the association to share the expenses and burdens of
the church's upkeep. This temple could function as an exclusionary
club good if some of the community's members did not plan to at-
tend it, but only wanted to live among church-goers.' As a doc-
trinal matter, it seems as though such a requirement to pay for a
common amenity would satisfy the various requirements necessary
for covenants or equitable servitudes to bind successors in inter-
est.'29 Because an exclusionary club good merely taxes incoming
property owners who do not share the faith, without restraining
alienation to them outright, such a financing scheme arguably
would not violate public policy." After all, covenants and equita-
ble servitudes restricting religious institutions from common inter-
est communities have long been deemed enforceable, based on
pro-contract and state neutrality rationales that logically could be
extended to cover mandates that homeowners subsidize resident
religious institutions.'
'
27Taormina Theosophical Cmty., Inc. v. Silver, 190 Cal. Rptr. 38 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983). Under the Fair Housing Act, a religious organization may discriminate on the
basis of religion with respect to housing that the organization owns or controls
through a non-profit. United States v. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d 877, 882 (3d
Cir. 1990). A for-profit developer would not be able to take advantage of this exemp-
tion. Id. at 882-83.
"For example, people may feel like "cultural" Jews or Catholics, even if they are
not religiously observant. It could be rational for such people to pay for a synagogue
or church, even if they never planned to attend services, so as to attract people with
whom they share cultural affinities to the community. For an illuminating discussion
of the role of churches and synagogues in encouraging residential sorting and hasten-
ing or resisting neighborhood flight, see Gerald Gamm, Urban Exodus: Why the Jews
Left Boston and the Catholics Stayed 229-60 (1999).
29 See supra note 95.
3o Under the Restatement approach, an equitable servitude generally binds succes-
sors unless it (1) "is arbitrary, spiteful, or capricious"; (2) "unreasonably burdens a
fundamental constitutional right"; (3) "imposes an unreasonable restraint on alien-
ation"; (4) "imposes an unreasonable restraint on trade or competition"; or (5) "is un-
conscionable." Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes § 3.1 (2000).
"' See, e.g., Hall v. Church of the Open Bible, 89 N.W.2d 798, 799-800 (Wis. 1958)
(noting that restrictive covenants excluding churches have been universally enforced).
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If the exclusionary amenities strategy might permit religious
communities from achieving what they could not otherwise achieve
without violating antidiscrimination law, why has no community
tried this approach? Until recently, that question remained a puz-
zle; however, developers in Collier County, Florida, appear poised
to use the exclusionary amenities strategy to create Ave Maria
Township, a place some are calling "America's first gated Catholic
community. 1 12 Because marketing the for-profit development ex-
clusively to Catholics is illegal, developers have tied the develop-
ment to Ave Maria University, a Catholic institution of higher
learning established by Domino's Pizza founder, Tom Monaghan.'33
Besides noting the development's proximity to the new university
and its many resources, Monaghan describes a "stunning church in
the center of town" and private chapels "within walking distance of
each home," envisioning "an extremely Catholic" population.' 3"
The developers anticipate that the development will be "primarily
Catholic," especially at the outset, but stress that they are "not go-
ing to discriminate or market to Catholics."'35 Of course, what is
implicit in these statements is explicit in this Article: One can cre-
ate a primarily Catholic development without any targeted market-
ing or overt discrimination.
Although club goods are a term of art in the economic literature,
the religious context shows that the universe of exclusionary club
goods may include amenities that are merely the functional equiva-
lent of club goods. For example, religious institutions are quite ra-
cially segregated in general, and many congregations are racially
homogenous.'36 Because members of a religious community typi-
132 Adam Reilly, City of God: Tom Monaghan's Coming Catholic Utopia, Boston
Phoenix, June 17, 2005, at 17.
133 Id.
,3 Id. at 17, 19. "Extremely Catholic" is a double entendre here. Some have sug-
gested that Ave Maria seeks to differentiate itself from other Catholic institutions,
like Notre Dame, which Ave Maria's founders regard as unduly progressive. See
Sharon Tubbs, School of Faith, St. Petersburg Times, Mar. 28, 2004, at 1E.
135 Reilly, supra note 132, at 19. This "focal points" statement from the developer,
quoted by a reporter, may well violate laws that bar religious discrimination in adver-
tising. Cf. supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
' Kevin D. Dougherty, How Monochromatic is Church Membership? Racial-
Ethnic Diversity in Religious Community, 64 Soc. Religion 65, 74-77 (2003) (noting
substantial racial homogeneity among U.S. congregations, but a great deal of hetero-
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cally value proximity to their place of worship, the presence of a
church or temple may, independently, promote racial sorting in the
surrounding neighborhood. A developer interested in promoting
racial homogeneity in his new development might therefore sell a
large plot of land within the development to a segregated congre-
gation on quite favorable terms, and then raise the price of the sur-
rounding homes to recoup this subsidy. The church will not for-
mally constitute a club good: Simply purchasing a home in the
subdivision will not entitle the homeowner to use the church.'37 But
it will function like an exclusionary club good, in the sense that all
homeowners in the development will be subsidizing the church's
land implicitly, and only those residents who worship at the church
or value the kinds of residential homogeneity associated with the
church membership will derive any benefit from this subsidy. As a
result, one might expect to see a heavy racial skew in the neighbor-
hood's population. For this reason, it makes sense to group exclu-
sionary club goods with other kinds of exclusionary amenities.
Public goods may also constitute a type of exclusionary amen-
ity."8 Local public goods, which confer greater utility on proximate
citizens, will function in an analogous way to club goods in a
homeowners' association. Local taxes will simply replace associa-
tion assessments as a sorting mechanism. As the following example
suggests, even non-local public goods can function as exclusionary
amenities.
2. Exclusionary Public Goods
Although this Article focuses on club goods in residential com-
munities, we should not be surprised to observe the same phe-
nomenon in virtual communities as well. Indeed, participants in
various virtual worlds have developed alternative languages with
their own grammars and conventions, many of which prove befud-
dling to the uninitiated.' Although some of these languages ap-
propriate internal messaging abbreviations that help shorten the
geneity with respect to income and education); Kinder & Mendelberg, supra note 71,
at 417.
SI thank Ed Kitch for raising this point.
See supra note 15.
... See F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92
Cal. L. Rev. 1, 26 n.128 (2004).
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length of typed communications, one prominent online language-
133t ("leet")-is properly understood as facilitating encryption, not
communication. As a result, 133t is more cumbersome to use than
ordinary, American English.'" Efficiency considerations do not ex-
plain the proliferation of 133t-using English would be easier for
most of the inhabitants of these online communities.
Imposing these barriers to entry may maximize welfare for these
communities by making participation in certain online communi-
ties vexing for a naYve newcomer, referred to as a "nOOb" (newbie)
by the computer savvy. One purpose of these languages is to mar-
ginalize newbies and exclude the virtual riff-raff."' Newbies can of
course learn 133t eventually, but this process will take time, and
that lag will encourage the greenest entrants into virtual worlds to
spend more time observing and less time typing during their initial
forays. L33t thus can function as a means of discouraging those
who are non-savvy, impatient, or unwilling to incur substantial lan-
guage-learning costs from joining Internet-based subcultures. '42
III. INCLUSIONARY AMENITIES
In the previous pages, I have suggested that an exclusionary
amenities strategy is neither good nor evil. Rather, it might further
good or evil purposes, depending on the particular setting in which
it is employed. Normative considerations might cause us to view
the exclusionary amenities strategy unfavorably if used by Cauca-
sians to exclude African Americans from an affluent neighbor-
hood, but favorably if used by members of a religious minority that
risks losing its identity to establish a critical mass of believers in a
,0See Blake Sherblom-Woodward, Hackers, Garners and Lamers: The Use of 133t
in the Computer Sub-Culture 6-9 (Fall 2002) (unpublished senior thesis, Swarthmore
University), available at http://www.swarthmore.edu/SocSci/Linguistics/papers/2003/
sherblomwoodward.pdf; Microsoft.com, A Parent's Primer to Computer Slang, Feb. 4,
2005, http:// www.microsoft.com/athome/security/children/kidtalk.mspx; see also Eng-
lish to Hackerspeak Translator, http://www.cs.utk.edu/-cjohnson/computing/
javascript/round-hackerspeak.php (last visited Feb. 17, 2006). I thank Neil Richards
for alerting me to 133t as an online manifestation of the exclusionary club goods phe-
nomenon.
... Sherblom-Woodward, supra note 140, at 14-15.
,' It has long been recognized that the adoption of common languages can enhance
social solidarity. Lessig, supra note 18, at 976-77.
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particular physical space.' 3 This discussion of exclusionary ameni-
ties raises an additional implication: Inclusionary amenities should
also exist. The presence of such goods would spark residential het-
erogeneity, and the absence of such goods should function in the
same way as the presence of exclusionary amenities.
A. Examples of Inclusionary Club Goods
An inclusionary club good is a heterogeneity-promoting re-
source that does not, by itself, provide enough welfare to the exist-
ing residents of a particular community to explain its presence. The
inclusionary club good does, however, make the community attrac-
tive to residents who would not otherwise choose to live there. In-
clusionary club goods are likely to arise in settings where the mem-
bers of a community believe that they share undesirable
homogeneities, and that the community will be better off if a more
heterogeneous resident pool is integrated into the community. In-
clusionary club goods will be adopted, in short, to make the com-
position of a building or development better reflect the heteroge-
neity that exists in the wider surrounding community.
For example, student residential buildings on college campuses
occasionally acquire reputations as non-academically rigorous, and
sometimes these reputations are well deserved. At some point,
members of a community may decide that this non-academic repu-
tation imposes substantial costs on the members, such as dimin-
ished access to employment networks, lower status relative to
members of other communities, or unwelcome scrutiny from uni-
versity administrators. To that end, the members may decide to
devote a large amount of scarce public space to a "study room,"
and renovate the study room to make it look tranquil, attractive,
and nicely furnished. Although the current residents, and those in
the subsequent few years, may infrequently use the study room,
this will change. In time, as successive groups of incoming residents
come and go, the presence of the study room might cause more
studious students to self-select into the house, and some of these
' It may be more difficult to justify religious residential segregation by members of
vibrant, commonly practiced religions, such as Roman Catholicism, though distinct
Roman Catholic subpopulations may be able to make colorable "critical mass" argu-
ments.
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newcomers may eventually start using the amenity. Initially, the
study room functions as an inclusionary club good, but eventually it
is transformed into an ordinary club good that is welfare maximiz-
ing on its own terms."
Anecdotal evidence suggests that inclusionary club goods of this
nature are common.45 Some condominium buildings provide gyms
that are underutilized by the members, but the space is not con-
verted to higher utility uses because of a concern that the absence
of a gym would send the wrong message to certain kinds of buyers.
Similarly, some condominiums maintain party rooms and other so-
cial spaces that go underutilized by its introverted residents. The
idea here is that incoming buyers may value sociability within a
condo's corridors, but that reliable information about sociability is
hard to come by for many potential purchasers. The party room
may provide a reassuring message to such potential purchasers
and, over time, may become a more efficiently utilized amenity
through the operation of selection effects. 46
Perhaps the most prominent example of the inclusionary ameni-
ties approach is the retrofitting of various residential buildings to
'44 Inclusionary club goods of other sorts are prevalent in college and university set-
tings. Most provocatively, there is a sense in which affirmative action policies function
as inclusionary club goods, as opposed to mere inclusionary devices. That is, it is likely
that many sought-after Caucasian college students want to attend a university that has
a racially diverse student body. Racial preferences in admission therefore may be de-
signed to attract not only members of minority groups, but also to attract these het-
erogeneity-seeking Caucasians. Were a university to abolish race-based affirmative
action, this might not only increase the percentage of Caucasians in the student body,
but it might also skew the attributes of those Caucasians in the student body by at-
tracting Caucasians who prefer racial homogeneity or do not care much about racial
diversity, while turning off potential applicants who value racial heterogeneity.
Similarly, college athletic programs may function as inclusionary club goods. Out-
standing academic universities with strong Division I-A sports programs, like Michi-
gan, Stanford, and Duke, may use their college athletic programs to ensure that a
wide range of applicants seek admission at their schools. In the absence of high-
profile athletic teams, a research university may struggle to attract the proverbial
"well rounded" students who value more than just academic intensity in a learning
environment.
,' The study room example identified in the paragraph above is drawn from the au-
thor's own experience with off-campus student housing at Berkeley.
'" On the connection between condominium amenities and resident selection ef-
fects, see Kathy McCormick, Condo Amenities Reflect Changing Needs: Cover the
Gamut from Car Wash Bays to 24-Hour Concierge, Nat'l Post, Mar. 3, 2001, at N4;
see also text accompanying supra note 79.
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permit access by the disabled. Prior to the enactment of the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and similar state laws
mandating reasonable accommodations for the disabled, numerous
building owners voluntarily embraced ramps, elevators, and other
accommodations designed to make their buildings more hospitable
to handicapped individuals. Such voluntary steps were designed
to undercut the segregation of the disabled and to permit disabled
Americans to interact freely with their able-bodied peers. Indeed,
these voluntary steps helped mainstream the disabled, which in
turn galvanized them as a political interest group that lobbied for
the enactment of the ADA.
Local governments use inclusionary public goods to compete for
heterogeneous residents as well. In recent years, communities with
declining economic bases, like Peoria, Memphis, and Fresno, have
begun investing significant resources in the creation of "artist colo-
nies" and other efforts to attract young members of the creative
class. 48 This effort, inspired in large part by Richard Florida's in-
fluential book, The Rise of the Creative Class,'9 is designed to boost
economic growth by attracting the young, energetic, and well-
educated art and culture lovers who are sought by major employ-
ers. Communities across the United States are investing in public
147 See, e.g., Dick Thornburgh, The Americans with Disabilities Act: What It Means
to All Americans, 64 Temp. L. Rev. 375, 376, 383 (1991); Tim Gilmer, A Tale of Two
Cities, New Mobility, June 2002, available at http://www.newmobility.con/review-
article.cfm?id=555&action=browse (noting that Venice, Florida, tried to make itself
accessible to the disabled decades before the enactment of legislation mandating ac-
cess).
"s See, e.g., Abe Aamidor, Cool Indy, Indianapolis Star, Oct. 3, 2004, at J1; Timothy
J. Gibbons, The Cool Factor: Jacksonville Has Much to Do to Attract Young, Crea-
tive Workers, Fla. Times-Union, Feb. 16, 2004, at 10; Keith Herbert, Struggling Bor-
ough Tries to Get Creative: Norristown Hopes Artists Will Be Drawn by Low Rent
and Incentives Such as Tax Breaks, Phila. Inquirer, Aug. 15, 2004, at B1; Elaine Hop-
kins, Cheap Rent + Good Light = Art: Arts Project Rep Says that Peoria's Buildings
Are the Perfect Places to Foster Creativity, Peoria J. Star, June 12, 2004, at B3; E.J.
Schultz, Artists, Writers and Young Professionals See Potential in the Region's Bud-
ding Arts and in Fresno's Reviving Downtown, as They Try to Remake the City
into ... Creative Fresno, Fresno Bee, Jan. 9, 2005, at D1; see also Robert R.M. Ver-
chick, Same-Sex and the City, 37 Urb. Law. 191, 193 (2005) (noting that municipalities
have tried to attract gays and lesbians, also on the basis of an "urban pioneer" the-
ory).
r46Richard Florida, The Rise of the Creative Class: And How It's Transforming
Work, Leisure, Community, and Everyday Life (2002).
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goods and club goods that are not terribly appealing to the existing
residents.'
The movement toward magnet schools in urban public school
districts reflects a similar dynamic. In many cities, white flight has
rendered the population of urban school districts, and the cities
themselves, heavily African American and Latino.' This wide-
spread exercise of the exit option by middle-class whites has im-
posed real costs on the lower-income populations that lack the re-
sources to exit urban school districts.' Several cities have tried to
counter this trend by investing heavily in selective magnet schools
as a means of attracting middle class parents back to public school
systems."' In communities where the magnet schools rely on apti-
tude tests or grades to help assign coveted slots to students, the ex-
isting population of a city may derive little direct benefit from
these schools-few children from poor neighborhoods have the
credentials to gain admission to selective magnets. Support for
these schools may still exist in poorer parts of the city, however, on
the theory that attracting middle class white parents back to the
school district will, in the long run, result in an expansion of re-
sources available to all the district's schools. To the extent that
such a dynamic plays out, a magnet school will function as an inclu-
sionary public good.
As some of these examples suggest, people concerned about
various forms of residential homogeneity should perhaps support
the inclusionary amenities strategy. Though they appear to be
vastly outnumbered by those Americans who prefer homogenous
subdivisions, a constituency of Americans who want to live in
neighborhoods that exhibit genuine racial and economic diversity
" One problem with Richard Florida's approach is that the fight over members of
the creative class is in some respects a zero-sum game, so as more municipalities vie
for the same piece of the pie, the returns from strategies designed to appeal to them
will diminish.
5 ' James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 Yale L.J. 249, 281-83 & n.152
(1999).
Fennell, supra note 13, at 25-31.
"' Robin D. Barnes, Black America and School Choice: Charting a New Course, 106
Yale L.J. 2375, 2402 (1997). Several papers have critiqued the use of magnet schools
to diminish white flight. See, e.g., Christine Rossell, The Desegregation Efficiency of
Magnet Schools, 38 Urb. Aff. Rev. 697 (2003); Kimberly C. West, Note, A Desegrega-
tion Tool That Backfired: Magnet Schools and Classroom Segregation, 103 Yale L.J.
2567 (1994).
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exists. Consider the young, upwardly mobile, urban pioneers who
have been occupying the "edgy" loft apartments within earshot of
Los Angeles's Skid Row.
Two important points about inclusionary amenities are worth
making before proceeding further. First, although it is likely that
exclusionary amenities are more common than inclusionary ameni-
ties, examples of the latter may be more readily accessible. One
likely explanation for this phenomenon is that people are generally
quite willing to talk about inclusionary motivations, but reluctant
to discuss exclusionary strategies in polite society. Thus, when de-
velopers create exclusionary amenities, they will likely choose not
to discuss their true motivations out of fear of violating antidis-
crimination laws or generating controversy. Indeed, their market-
ing strategies may be aimed at potential customers who, thanks to
unconscious racism, prefer racial homogeneity, but would be reluc-
tant to admit that preference to third parties or even to them-
selves."' By contrast, inclusionary amenities designed to increase
heterogeneity within a residential setting are generally thought
laudable, and may even require substantial publicity if they are to
be effective. For instance, if Peoria wants to create an artists' col-
ony, it cannot simply draw on artists who live in Peoria's suburbs.'56
Rather, it will need a regional, or perhaps even national, campaign
in order to achieve the critical mass of artists who will alter the na-
ture of the community.' That said, inclusionary amenities often
will not be cost effective because of the legality of inclusionary ad-
vertisements, which will function as a reasonably close substitute
for inclusionary amenities. This situation contrasts sharply with the
See Bernard E. Harcourt, Policing L.A.'s Skid Row: Crime and Real Estate
Redevelopment in Downtown Los Angeles [An Experiment in Real Time], 2005 U.
Chi. Legal F. 323, 333.
' See generally Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317 (1987).
116 Does Peoria have suburbs? Indeed, it does. See, e.g., Lacon, Illinois; Morton, Illi-
nois; Spring Bay, Illinois, and Pekin, Illinois.
'.. For this reason, it may be appropriate to define exclusionary amenities with ref-
erence to people who live within a metropolitan area but are targeted for exclusion
from a particular development, and inclusionary amenities with reference to people
who live throughout the United States but are targeted for inclusion in a particular
development. Residential developers sometimes try to attract residents from distant
states or regions, but rarely worry about excluding residents from distant states or re-
gions.
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legal regime governing exclusionary advertisements, which helps
drive the use of exclusionary amenities. When should one expect to
find inclusionary amenities, then? Perhaps only in those instances
where "talk is cheap" and a more expensive investment in inclu-
sion is necessary to attract a heterogeneous audience to a homoge-
neous community.
Second, the determination of what constitutes an exclusionary or
inclusionary amenity will be highly context-dependent. It is possi-
ble to imagine circumstances under which a particular amenity
might exclude in some contexts and include in others. For instance,
if citizens in a predominantly poor African American neighbor-
hood decided to replace a dilapidated public housing project with a
high-quality golf course surrounded by stylish bungalows, the resi-
dential golf course would function as an inclusionary club good-a
resource designed to desegregate a heavily segregated neighbor-
hood-and make its population more reflective of the racial and
economic diversity that exists in the United States more generally.
Indeed, residents have pursued a similar strategy at the Franklin
Park Golf Club in Boston, a racially mixed golf club described as
"a large oasis of peace and racial harmony within a generally hos-
tile environment.
158
B. Inclusionary Club Good Voids
Just as inclusionary club goods can be used to attract diverse
residents to homogeneous communities, communities can maintain
their homogeneity through the conscious choice to avoid inclusion-
ary club goods or public goods. A desire to avoid offering inclu-
sionary club goods might cause community residents to forego the
provision of the communal resources that they would otherwise
prefer.159
' Mitchelson & Lazaro, supra note 64, at 52-53.
There are important connections between my argument here and an argument
voiced by Clayton Gillette. He notes that within common interest communities, cer-
tain types of restrictive covenants might be imposed, not because the residents object
to the proscribed land uses themselves, but because they object to the types of people
who might engage in the proscribed uses. Gillette gives the following example, justify-
ing restrictions on trailer homes:
[E]ven where individuals do not have an aversion to certain practices that are
prohibited in covenants, such as maintenance of trailer homes, they may believe
that there is a correlation between the subject of the covenant and characteris-
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For instance, many communities desire access to public transpor-
tation hubs. Even if such hubs are shunned by commuters, who in-
creasingly prefer to drive to work alone, they provide enormous
value to those not yet old enough to drive, those too old to drive,
and those unable to afford or use motor vehicles of their own. Peo-
ple who drive to work everyday may also garner substantial bene-
fits from having bus or subway routes nearby, for example, by free-
ing up scarce freeway space or making it easier for babysitters,
house cleaners, or other car-less service providers to reach their
homes." Perhaps most importantly, proximity to efficient light rail
and subway lines generally increases property values.161 Yet many
communities are nearly devoid of efficient public transportation.
Part of the resistance to public transportation may stem from
concerns about the extent to which such transportation amounts to
an inclusionary public good. For example, in the process of plan-
tics that can serve as the basis for a desirable affinity. I may have nothing
against trailer homes, other things being equal. That is, I may believe that they
are not aesthetically displeasing, and may believe that they offer the best avail-
able housing opportunities for a large segment of the population. I may, how-
ever, simultaneously seek a relatively noise-free environment, or assurances
that I live among others who do not mind a high degree of regimentation, and
hence are less likely to be offended when I complain of what to me is excessive
noise. A covenant against "unreasonable noise" may be too imprecise to ac-
complish my objectives. I therefore may prefer a more certain surrogate that re-
flects the level of comfort to which I aspire. If I believe that the presence of
trailers is positively correlated with bothersome levels of noise, a covenant
against trailer homes may serve this proxy role.
Gillette, supra note 28, at 1396; see also McKenzie, supra note 4, at 76-77 (noting that
those who wanted to preserve racial segregation after Shelley v. Kraemer viewed
covenants "that targeted certain objectionable practices" as "the next best thing to
race restrictive covenants"). The essential difference between Gillette's example and
my own is strategic. Gillette focuses on covenants that restrict the use of particular
private goods, whereas my examples show how the same objectives can be satisfied
through the provision (or lack thereof) of club and public goods.
"0In theory, service providers ought to be able to pass these transportation costs
onto homeowners whose homes are not proximate to public transportation. Their
ability to do so may be constrained, however, to the extent that demand for these ser-
vices is elastic.
6, See, e.g., Hong Chen et al., Measuring the Impact of Light Rail Systems on Single
Family Home Values: A Hedonic Approach with GIS Application (Portland State
Univ. Ctr. for Urban Studies, Discussion Paper No. 97-3, 1997), available at http://
www.upa.pdx.edu/CUS/publications/docs/DP97-3.pdf; Roderick B. Diaz, Impacts of
Rail Transit on Property Values (Am. Pub. Transp. Ass'n, Wash., D.C.), May 1999,
available at http://apta.com/research/info/briefings/documents/diaz.pdf.
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ning the Washington, D.C., subway, citizens in various relatively
affluent areas opposed the establishment of subway stations be-
cause of concerns that inner city denizens would ride the subways
into their neighborhoods.6 ' Affluent neighborhoods in other parts
of the country have done likewise, foregoing otherwise desirable
investments in valuable amenities like well-maintained public
roads, parks, and even street signs because of fears that such
amenities would attract undesirables." Exclusionary zoning would
be adequate to keep the poor from living in these communities, but
an exclusionary dearth of public goods is necessary to keep them
out entirely." In other affluent neighborhoods, such as the Hamp-
162 See Zachary Moses Schrag, The Washington Metro as Vision and Vehicle, 1955-
2001, at 268-71 (2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University) (on file
with the Virginia Law Review Association). Although it is often asserted that
neighbors' fear of outsiders explains the absence of a subway station in Georgetown,
see, e.g., Stephen C. Fehr, Where D.C. Wants Metro to Go Next, Wash. Post, Mar. 23,
1994, at D3, and Juan Williams, Georgetown: Separate City, Wash. Post, Dec. 8, 1981,
at A21, Schrag concludes that there is only "a kernel of truth" to the Georgetown
story, since engineering challenges and economic considerations helped steer the
Metro away from Georgetown. Schrag, supra, at 268-69; see also Bob Levey, Metro's
Not Coming to Georgetown-and Nobody's Crying, Wash. Post, June 30, 1977, at
D.C.1 (noting several bases for neighborhood opposition).
163Loewen, supra note 122, at 254-55 ("At the behest of the wealthy.., officials in
Nassau County allowed all public roads to fall into disrepair.... [R]esidents of... a
New York City suburb would rather bear the inconvenience of narrow and congested
streets on a day-by-day basis than make it easier for the inhabitants of New York City
to reach the town. Even street signs are in short supply in Darien, Connecticut, mak-
ing it hard to find one's way around that elite sundown suburb. Darien doesn't really
want a lot of visitors, a resident pointed out, and keeping Darien confusing for strang-
ers might deter criminals-perhaps a veiled reference to African Ameri-
cans.... Sidewalks and bike paths are rare and do not connect to those in other
communities inhabited by residents of lower social and racial status. Some white sub-
urbs of San Francisco opted out of the Bay Area Rapid Transit system, fearing it
might encourage African Americans to move in.... Parks, tennis courts, and play-
grounds may be few or located on minor roads where visitors will be unlikely to find
them.... San Marino, an elite suburb of Los Angeles, closes its parks on weekends to
make sure the neighboring Asian and Latin communities are excluded, thus keeping
out everyone, even its own residents.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
'A similar example arises in Chicago's Hyde Park community-an increasingly
affluent university neighborhood that, quite conspicuously, lacks a movie theater.
Hyde Park had a movie theater in the 1990s, but it drew large numbers of African
American youths from surrounding Chicago neighborhoods. Eventually, the Univer-
sity of Chicago, which owned the land, elected to close the cinema entirely, notwith-
standing complaints from students. Hyde Park's lack of a cinema and other enter-
tainment amenities prompts many graduate and professional students to live in
distant neighborhoods and endure long commutes to the campus.
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tons, where the incursion of African Americans is viewed as
unlikely, but the perceived threat posed by Latino immigrants is
substantial, homeowners are happy to support the construction of
basketball courts on public land, but they fight hard against the
creation of soccer fields.'65 In some communities, the desire to ex-
clude is sufficiently powerful to overcome the added value associ-
ated with transit and recreational improvements.
IV. REGULATING THE PROVISION OF EXCLUSIONARY AND
INCLUSIONARY AMENITIES
So far, this Article has shown how communities can use exclu-
sionary amenities or an absence of inclusionary amenities to pro-
mote residential homogeneity. As I suggested, there will be in-
stances in which many readers will sympathize with this behavior
(e.g., critical mass for a marginalized religious minority), and in-
stances in which most readers will not sympathize (e.g., racial ho-
mogeneity, achieved through the use of exclusionary amenities).
How should the law respond to these strategies? I offer prelimi-
nary thoughts below, and hope that these ideas will spark further
discussion.
A. A Normative Framework
My approach to this topic, as to most other topics, is principally
welfarism. With respect to social welfare, the analysis should, and
does, depend very much on the characteristics of the groups being
included or excluded. For example, there is a wealth of social sci-
ence evidence pointing to the enormous social costs of residential
racial segregation." These costs appear to fall particularly heavily
on racial minorities, in that the exclusion of minorities from resi-
dential communities engenders their absence from valuable social
networks.6 The exclusion of various groups from affluent residen-
165Dolgon, supra note 29, at 124-25, 156.
166 See supra text accompanying notes 68-69 and sources cited therein.
'67 Many theorists who are sympathetic to welfarism have moved away from pure
preference-satisfaction accounts of social welfare by disregarding any positive utility
associated with the satisfaction of racist preferences. For a discussion, see Howard F.
Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto Princi-
ple, 110 Yale L.J. 173, 179-96 (2000).
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tial communities may also undermine meritocratic values in the
sense that members of these residential communities achieve extra
economic and social advancement by virtue of that residence, as
opposed to individual merit." A welfarist account of religious or
linguistic exclusion might reach quite different results, although the
dearth of empirical evidence on this score may reduce this analysis
to educated guesswork.
Welfarism is not, of course, the only criterion for evaluating the
use of exclusionary amenities, and, to be sure, non-welfarist con-
siderations have emerged in my treatment of this issue. Distribu-
tionalist treatments of the subject may focus on the extent to which
exclusionary club goods are used by the resource-rich to marginal-
ize the resource-poor.'69 Reviewing the cases cited herein, it seems
that exclusionary amenities are often used by the relatively affluent
or powerful to exclude members of relatively less affluent or less
powerful groups from their midst. That said, the exclusion of racial
minorities from gated communities, for example, is typically di-
rected against the more affluent members of a relatively poor ra-
cial group. Thus, from a distributional perspective, the use of ex-
clusionary amenities to keep middle-income blacks out of white
neighborhoods or to keep moderate-income Protestants out of
Catholic neighborhoods is far less problematic than the use of ex-
clusionary zoning techniques to keep the poor out of wealthier
neighborhoods.
B. Antidiscrimination Law
This Article has argued that when the law bars discriminatory
restraints on alienation, entry, and advertising, communities whose
residents prefer particular kinds of homogeneity may substitute an
exclusionary amenities strategy or a lack of inclusionary amenities
" Julius Chambers, Adequate Education for All: A Right, An Achievable Goal, 22
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 55, 55-56 (1987) (discussing the detrimental effects of public
school segregation on meritocracy).
169 We might conceptualize anti-subordination analysis as a variant on distributional
analysis. An anti-subordination analysis would also examine the distributive conse-
quences of the law's tolerance for exclusionary club goods strategies, but would em-
phasize the extent to which those strategies reinforce a caste system among groups in
American society, focusing particularly on any harms suffered by African Americans.
See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Phil. & Pub. Aff.
107, 147-70 (1976).
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strategy. This raises the question of what is worse: the medicine or
the disease? If the exclusionary amenities strategy produces worse
societal outcomes than overt discrimination, savvy policymakers
might contemplate doing away with antidiscrimination laws alto-
gether.
Exclusionary amenities present a form of discrimination less
"efficient" than overt discrimination. However, this inefficiency
yields some social benefits, as well. The social costs equal the
deadweight losses that result from the expenditure of scarce
societal resources on sorting club goods.70 For example, society
may have built too many residential golf courses during the 1990s,
resulting in wasteful land use policies and, in this instance,
substantial environmental damage. 7 ' Repealing antidiscrimination
laws might well eliminate this excess demand for golf course
construction. However, much of this social waste is funded by
those seeking residential homogeneity. 2 To that extent, permitting
exclusionary amenities as a lawful alternative to overt
discrimination might function as an excise tax on residential
homogeneity. It would be a wonderful coincidence if the costs
imposed by this tax were equivalent to the social costs of the
resulting residential homogeneity, but the likelihood of estab-
lishing a Pigouvian efficient tax are exceedingly low."' That said, in
a society that values residential heterogeneity as a general matter,
"taxing" exclusion in this way may help ensure that people who
choose to engage in this form of exclusion have rather strong
preferences for doing so.
170 Cf. Becker & Murphy, supra note 15, at 72 (making this point as applied to the
governmental provision of public goods).
171 For discussions of the ecological consequences of golf course development, see
James C. Balogh et al., Background and Overview of Environmental Issues, in Golf
Course Management & Construction: Environmental Issues 1 (James C. Balogh &
William J. Walker eds., 1992); M. K. Brewin, An Annotated Bibliography and Litera-
ture Review on the Potential Impacts of Golf Courses on Freshwater Environments
44-129 (1992) (summarizing the existing literature and providing an annotated bibli-
ography); Michael A. Lewis et al., Effects of a Coastal Golf Complex on Water Qual-
ity, Periphyton, and Seagrass, 53 Ecotoxicology & Envtl. Safety 154 (2002); and Dep't
of Envtl. Res. Mgmt., Environmental Quality Monitoring at Five Municipal Golf
Courses in Miami-Dade County (2002), available at http://www.miamidade.gov/derm/
land/library/golf-course.pdf.
SThough not all. Again note the environmental externalities in the golf context.
See R.H. Coase, The Firm, the Market, and the Law 182-85 (1988).
2006]
Virginia Law Review
Gary Becker, Richard Epstein, and others have argued that the
market adequately punishes people who refuse to deal with Afri-
can American customers by depriving them of an important mar-
ket."' The presence of strong and broad consumer demand for seg-
regated environments will, by the same token, reward developers
who cater to that demand. In a world where large numbers of Cau-
casians are willing to pay a premium for neighborhoods that ex-
hibit rather substantial racial homogeneity,17 the waste associated
with the provision of exclusionary amenities may provide the only
significant penalty suffered by an entrepreneur who satisfies these
discriminatory preferences.
Exclusionary amenities strategies necessarily create a second
kind of inefficiency: They will be less precise than overt discrimina-
tion. Tiger Woods is not the only affluent African American golfer.
Consequently, a homeowners' association that tries to use golf as a
proxy for race may not achieve complete racial homogeneity. That
might be beneficial in several respects. First, exposure to some ra-
cial heterogeneity, albeit a limited amount, may result in prefer-
ence changes that would not occur in a world of complete homoge-
neity. Evidence shows that both Caucasians and African
Americans possess fewer interracial prejudices and will be more
willing to integrate following greater interracial interaction.'76 Sec-
ond, exclusionary amenities strategies diminish the liberty of mem-
bers of the excluded group less than overt discrimination does. An
African American non-golfer can join a mandatory membership
residential golf community-he will just have to pay a premium to
do so. As a result, we might expect that he will resent the exclu-
sionary device less. Finally, preferences for the good in question
may change over time. In recent years, African Americans have
taken up golf in increasing numbers.' If this trend continues, then
golf courses will no longer function effectively as exclusionary club
"See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, The Economics of Discrimination 41 (2d ed. 1971);
Richard A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employment Discrimina-
tion Laws 41-42 (1992).
... See Dawkins, supra note 26, at 387-88.
1
61 Id. at 389; see also Chambers, supra note 123; Tollison, supra note 12, at 283.
177Nat'l Golf Found., supra note 86, at 4; April Adamson, Tiger Draws Many to
Sport, Phila. Daily News, June 24, 2004, at 30.
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goods, and Caucasians interested in racial homogeneity will have
to resort to other sorting devices.
For all these reasons then, the "inefficiencies" associated with
exclusionary club good strategies may enhance social welfare.
When communities are forced to substitute exclusionary amenities
for overt exclusionary admission criteria or restraints on sales, this
dynamic may actually enhance social welfare. That said, it is still
worth considering whether society would be better off trying to re-
strict exclusionary amenities strategies or leaving them unregu-
lated, as the law currently does.
C. Administrative Concerns
Let us focus on the use of exclusionary amenities to achieve ob-
jectionable ends, such as the exclusion of African Americans from
overwhelmingly Caucasian neighborhoods. Should the law pro-
scribe the creation of club goods that deter African Americans
from joining a particular community? Not necessarily. In a world
where courts are prone to error, and evidence of discriminatory in-
tent is difficult to gather, policing the provision of exclusionary
amenities will often prove quite difficult. After all, there is substan-
tial demand for residential golf courses, and a desire for racial ho-
mogeneity is not the only plausible explanation for a mandatory
membership structure. Mandatory membership may be designed to
combat free riding by those who benefit from a golf course's views
and open space but do not contribute to its upkeep. Moreover,
mandatory membership might be designed as a pre-commitment
device for residents to contract for high levels of social interactions
among neighborhood residents.'78 Finally, there may be alternative
reasons, quite apart from racial bias, to explain why golfers want to
live among fellow golfers. For example, doing so may reduce the
search costs associated with obtaining useful golf tips. As a result, it
is appropriate to proscribe exclusionary amenities strategies only
"' Members might value social interactions as such, and may therefore want to bind
themselves to interact socially with their neighbors. Mandatory membership will re-
duce each household's disposable income, thereby limiting their opportunities for so-
cial interactions with people from outside the residential golf community. Since peo-
ple have difficulty ignoring sunk costs, having already paid for a membership at a golf
club might cause them to play more golf and attend more golf-course-related events
than they otherwise would have.
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where the club good in question would not have been provided but
for the desire to achieve a type of residential homogeneity that vio-
lates public policy interests. If a developer can show that consumer
demand for an amenity is sufficient to explain its procurement, and
that preferences for resident homogeneity do not drive that de-
mand for the amenity, antidiscrimination law should not interfere
with the developer's choices about what amenities to offer.
Where the law does attempt to defeat exclusionary amenities
strategies, some governmental approaches will be superior to oth-
ers. Given the risk of false positives, it seems wise to police the fi-
nancing mechanisms for club goods before policing the actual pro-
vision of those club goods themselves. There is nothing
objectionable about mandatory membership in golf communities
that charge all residents for the positive externalities that the golf
course confers on them. This requires charging golfers within a
residential golf development for open space, views, and golf, and
charging non-golfers for open space and views. In fact, many resi-
dential golf communities provide such two-tiered membership
structures, 179 and even those that do not are likely to implicitly
charge non-golfers by capitalizing the extra value of a view into the
original purchase price of a home. Accordingly, where strong evi-
dence suggests that the provision of exclusionary amenities pro-
motes residential segregation, the appropriate solution is not to
ban residential golf communities. Rather, the remedy should be to
invalidate mandatory membership schemes for golf-playing, which
is racially skewed, as opposed to golf-course-view-enjoyment,
which is more likely to be racially neutral." This approach is essen-
tially the unbundling strategy that is well-integrated into antitrust
79 See Cory et al., supra note 112, at 166-73; see also supra note 121.
"'In the alternative, the common law property doctrine of "touch and concern"
might be resuscitated as a means of stamping out the use of exclusionary club goods.
Covenants that do not "touch and concern" the land will not run with the land, mean-
ing that they will not be enforceable against second generation owners in a residential
development. See supra note 95. The trend in property law has been to treat "touch
and concern" as a doctrine that reflects the state's interests in the nonenforcement of
promises that run contrary to public policy interests. See Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir,
The Objectivity of Well-Being and the Objectives of Property Law, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1669, 1735-36 (2003); Michael Madison, The Real Properties of Contract Law, 82
B.U. L. Rev. 405,453 (2002).
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law. 8' Developers could still build homes next to golf courses, but
they could not mandate that these homeowners purchase costly
memberships to those courses or otherwise force purchasers to
bear the capitalized costs of golf course land acquisition and up-
keep. The unbundling strategy essentially eliminates the opportu-
nity to use exclusionary amenities as a discriminatory tax that falls
hardest on members of undesired groups."
The prospect of inclusionary club goods brings to mind another
remedial possibility. Rather than require unbundling, the law
might mandate bundling of a different sort. Where there are sub-
stantial concerns about the use of exclusionary amenities to pro-
mote homogeneity, the law might demand the coupling of exclu-
sionary club goods with inclusionary club goods. For example, if a
developer wants to put a rock climbing wall in a new development,
the law might also require him to build a basketball court next
door. Such a coupling scheme might produce a world with too few
residential golf courses, but it would also promote the construction
of more basketball courts, which are probably undersupplied by
the market for the reasons developed in this Article. Even if such a
mandate results in a basketball court glut, the positive externalities
associated with interracial relationships established on the court
seem to make basketball an activity worth subsidizing, particularly
in suburban residential communities. That said, unbundling is
probably a more precise tool than this form of super-bundling, in
,81 See generally Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, A Consumer-Welfare Ap-
proach to the Mandatory Unbundling of Telecommunications Networks, 109 Yale
L.J. 417 (1999); Randal C. Picker, The Digital Video Recorder: Unbundling Advertis-
ing and Content, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 205 (2004).
" To be sure, permitting the construction of exclusionary amenities near homes
might still facilitate pernicious forms of segregation through a focal points mecha-
nism. That is to say, in a world with no mandatory membership exclusionary ameni-
ties, those with a preference for racial homogeneity would be drawn to residential
communities that are located near racially polarizing amenities, and those with a pref-
erence for racial heterogeneity might be deterred from moving in to these communi-
ties. But a central argument of this Article is that focal points and sorting are particu-
larly powerful when they function together, and the unbundling strategy at least
prevents sorting from occurring. Moreover, many new residential developments are
surrounded by undeveloped or agricultural land. Robert W. Burchell, Economic and
Fiscal Costs (and Benefits) of Sprawl, 29 Urb. Law. 159, 160 (1997). In these commu-
nities, developers prevent people from "free-riding" on the homogeneity that results
from exclusionary amenities by ensuring that only residents of the common interest
community can live near the exclusionary amenity.
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the sense that it would be difficult to calibrate the optimal level of
extra bundling to offset the adverse consequences of an exclusion-
ary-amenities approach. Mandated bundling would, however, be
preferable in instances where the relevant decisionmakers felt that
there were too few social interactions in the community, and that,
in the absence of collective amenities that prompted face-to-face
interactions, relations among heterogeneous members of a residen-
tial community would suffer too much.
This Article has argued that divergent preferences for amenities
and activities among members of different racial groups are not in-
nocuous because those divergences create an opening for develop-
ers interested in promoting residential segregation. Perhaps the
most promising strategy for combating the use of exclusionary
amenities is to try to alter the preferences of the group that is tar-
geted for exclusionary treatment. Tiger Woods's recent success on
the PGA Tour correlated with a staggering increase in the percent-
age of African Americans who identify themselves as avid golf
fans." Furthermore, the Tiger Woods Foundation has sought to
provide golfing opportunities to minority and disadvantaged
youth."' These demographic developments might render residen-
tial golf courses ineffective race-oriented exclusionary club goods
in the years ahead." Group disparities in preferences for club
'
83As a corollary to this point, it is worth examining whether the elimination of an
exclusionary amenity that promotes residential segregation, but that also facilitates
social interactions among all the residents of a community, represents an improve-
ment. In other words, will race relations be better in a community that is ninety-eight
percent white, but in which the non-whites interact with their neighbors substantially,
or in a community that is ninety percent white but provides fewer outlets for interac-
tions among neighbors?
"'In 1996, 10.1% of Caucasians and 2.5% of African Americans identified them-
selves as avid fans of professional golf. In 2003, 11.8% of Caucasians and 12.0% of
African Americans identified themselves as avid fans of professional golf. Thus,
whereas avid fandom increased by 16.8% among Caucasians, it increased by 380%
among African Americans. The increases among casual fans were not as dramatic.
Casual fandom increased by 10.5% among Caucasians and 73.2% among African
Americans. See Golf 20/20, Golf 20/20 Vision for the Future: Industry Report for
2003, at 12 (2004).
' Lieber, supra note 85, at 1C; see also Adamson, supra note 177.
6 Residential golf courses might still function as exclusionary club goods, but they
would prompt sorting on the basis of some factor other than race. For example, men
are noticeably more likely than women to participate in golf. See Nat'l Golf Found.,
supra note 86, at 20 (noting that twenty-two percent of white adult males play golf,
versus six percent of white adult females, although the discrepancies are less pro-
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goods are socially constructed. As such, they may be amenable to
concerted efforts by government or private groups to homogenize
preferences as a means of thwarting insidious exclusionary ameni-
ties strategies. '
D. Promoting Exclusionary Strategies
Given society's interest in promoting diversity among communi-
ties, as well as diversity within communities, there are arguably in-
stances in which the law should promote the use of exclusionary
amenities. Consider the efforts by deaf Americans to establish a
community made up largely of sign language speakers in Laurent,
South Dakota." There are strong welfarist arguments for such a
residential arrangement, given the network effects and economies
of scale associated with bringing speakers of this language together
in one place. There are sound political representation arguments as
well, and Laurent organizers are particularly enticed by the pros-
pect of electing representatives who will be forceful advocates for
their interests. 189 At present, few non-deaf people will want to live
in a community where sign language is the lingua franca. If Laurent
becomes economically successful, however, one can imagine that
those who are not fluent in sign language will move to Laurent in
search of economic opportunity. To Curtail such behavior, Laurent
may find it worthwhile to invest in exclusionary amenities.
nounced for racial minorities). Given this disparity, it may be that married couples
who purchase homes in residential golf communities are more patriarchal than ordi-
nary married couples, in the sense that the husband plays a dominant role in making
important family decisions, like the choice of residential location.
'7 Gobster, supra note 85, at 60-61.
'Their goal is to establish a new town "expressly created for people who sign."
Monica Davey, As Town for Deaf Takes Shape, Debate on Isolation Re-emerges,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 2005, at Al. Community planners were excited about the pros-
pect of a town in which signing is the language of choice and community services
could be geared toward a largely deaf population.
... Indeed, organizers selected South Dakota as a home for their community in no
small measure because of the state's small population and their anticipated ability to
achieve real political representation in short order. Id. Given South Dakota's climate,
its lack of economic opportunity, and its dearth of urban life, South Dakota may itself
function as an exclusionary public good. Signers are attracted to South Dakota, not
because of what it offers, but because of its effectiveness in keeping non-deaf outsid-
ers from outnumbering the deaf population in Laurent.
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Where a religious, linguistic, or other minority community genu-
inely requires some measure of critical mass to thrive, it may be
appropriate for the state to subsidize the creation of exclusionary
amenities or, failing that, at least to remain neutral. In such an in-
stance, neutrality would mean permitting the enforcement of cove-
nants and equitable servitudes designed to support the creation
and maintenance of these kinds of club goods. The law is a suffi-
ciently precise instrument to differentiate between these innocuous
uses of exclusionary amenities and strategies designed to exclude
marginalized racial minority groups from affluent neighborhoods.
CONCLUSION
Individuals care about the identities of their neighbors, and they
will expend substantial resources to recruit the desirable and deter
the undesirable from moving in. When the law prevents individuals
from using overt discrimination or discriminatory advertising to
control the composition of their neighborhoods, these individuals
may employ more subtle strategies to accomplish the same objec-
tive. Namely, developers or community residents may procure ex-
clusionary amenities that cause people to sort into or out of par-
ticular communities. Exclusionary amenities will be selected not on
the basis of how much inherent utility they provide for residents,
but because of how effectively they cause self-sorting by desirable
and undesirable residents, and how clearly they designate focal
points to which housing consumers can respond. These goods
would not be procured if overt discrimination were permitted. The
inability to exclude functions as an inducement to spend.
The phenomenon identified here involves high stakes. In recent
decades, the most important trend in American residential devel-
opment, and in property law more generally, has been the rise of
common interest communities." These communities spend more
than thirty billion dollars each year maintaining common ameni-
ties.'91 This Article raises the troubling possibility that exclusionary
1
'9Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy: Residential Associations
and Community, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 5 (1989); Lee Anne Fennell, Contracting
Communities, 2004 U. Ill. L. Rev. 829, 829-30; Robert H. Nelson, Privatizing the
Neighborhood: A Proposal to Replace Zoning with Private Collective Property
Rights to Existing Neighborhoods, 7 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 827, 827-28 (1999).
Christopher Conte, Boss Thy Neighbor, Governing, April 2001, at 38, 40.
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motivations explain some of these expenditures. It also posits that
starkly heterogeneous preferences for consumer goods among
members of different racial groups may be far more troubling than
previously thought.
Exclusionary amenities are not necessarily bad things. There
may be instances in which they are socially desirable. Likewise, in-
clusionary amenities might function as a tool for promoting resi-
dential heterogeneity. This Article suggests that there are certain
circumstances in which exclusionary amenities undermine impor-
tant public policy concerns, and in those circumstances the law
ought to police them through antidiscrimination law or property
doctrine. As a general matter, though, exclusionary amenities are
less problematic than overt discrimination. Consequently, this Ar-
ticle sounds a cautionary note, and argues against unduly vigorous
legal campaigns to stamp out all uses of this exclusionary device.
Indeed, when exclusionary amenities function in a way that un-
dermines important public policy interests, the best government re-
sponse may be to adopt policies that seek to homogenize prefer-
ences for the club good in question.
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